Vol 36.30 - Tisa 2 Spanish French Audio Video
|Hebrew Text: Likkutei Levi Yitzchak
(5752) Explanation of Likkutei Levi Yitzchak on Zohar (Our parsha 2:140) that the obligation to "say a thing in the name of the one who originally said it" is only "when the person saying the statement heard it from the author of the statement" however, not if he did not hear it from him the original author.
For seemingly there still is the admonition of "Rob not the poor" (Magen Avraham Orach Chaim 152:2 Mishlei 22:22 - "al tigzol dal", Bava Metzia 112 )
The reason that we find a wealth of sayings of the Sages that were not attributed to the original author;
The connection between saying something in the name of the original author to "Kinyan Torah"
1. The Zohar on our Parsha (2:188a-190a) tells of R’ Yose and R’ Chiya as they were travelling and speaking aspects of Torah. At the end, R’ Yose said a homily on the verse,
“And it shall be at the end of the days, that the mountain of the L-rd's house shall be firmly established at the top of the mountains . . and all the nations shall stream to it”.
After this, R’ Yose said,
“how meritorious is this path, for we merited to hear this thing. (R’ Yose said to him) From who did you hear this from? (R’ Chiya) said to him, one day I was walking on the path and I heard and saw R’ Hamnuna the Elder (alternatively R’ Shimon), who was expounding on this verse to R’ Acha. “
My father, in his notes on Sefer HaZohar elaborates in the explanation of the words of this Zohar according to Kabbalah. Among his words, he writes:
“R’ Chiya, in the beginning, when he said this homily to R’ Yose, did not say it in the name of R’ Hamnuna or R’ Shimon. Seemingly, one must say a thing in the name of the one who (originally) said it, as it states, ‘One who says something in the name of its speaker brings redemption to the world’.
According to the simple meaning, one could say that, when must one say the thing in the name of its speaker? when the speaker of the thing, says it to him (directly). Then he must say it in the name of its speaker.
This is like Mordechai and Esther, from which we learn this thing. For Mordechai said to Esther, as it states, ‘and it was told to Esther, the queen’. In such a case, one who hears from him, must say it in the name of its speaker, as it states, "And Esther told the king in the name of Mordechai." (Esther 2:22).
Whereas in our case, R’ Hamnuna or R’ Shimon did not say this (directly) to R’ Chiya, but rather to R’ Acha; and R’ Chiya, who happened to be there, also heard it. However, R’ Hamnuna or R’ Shimon did not say it (directly) to him. In such a case, one is not obligated to say it in the name of its speaker. For regarding this, there is no proof from Mordechai and Esther. For there, Mordechai told Esther. (Yet here, it was) only when R’ Yose asked ‘from where did you hear it’, did R’ Chiya tell from whom he heard it.
According to this, the wording of R’ Yose ‘from where did you hear it’ and not the phrase ‘who told you this’, comes out well.
For R’ Yose understood that this homily was not said (directly) to R’ Chiya. For if so, he would have said it in the name of the one who (originally) said it. . Therefore, he asked ‘from where did you hear it’, and not ‘who told you this’, for it was not said to R’ Chiya, but rather R’ Chiya heard it”. So far his words (עכ״ל).
2. One must understand:
Saying something in the name its (original) speaker is not just a Segulah for Geulah like the aforementioned saying of the Sages,
“One who says something in the name of its speaker brings redemption to the world’.
(whose source is in tractate Avot, and which is also stated in tractate Chullin and Niddah, as my father cites in the continuation of his words there.)
Rather it is a complete obligation, and is cited as Halacha in the Magen Avraham.
“One who does not say a thing in the name of its speaker transgresses a Negative Commandment (Lav) (as is states in tractate Nedarim (missing in our versions)”.
(the source is in the Midrash,
“R’ Chizkiah said that R’ Yermiah bar Abba said in the name of R’ Yochanan, whoever does not say something in the name of the one who said it, Scripture says, ‘do not rob the impoverished because he is impoverished.’ So, when a person hears something, it is necessary to cite it in the name of the one who originally said it).
According to this, one must explain that which my father states that,
“According to the simple meaning, one could say that, when must one say the thing in the name of its speaker? when the speaker of the thing, says it to him (directly). Then he must say it in the name of its speaker. This is like Mordechai and Esther”.
For seemingly, this difference only has a place regarding the aspect of the Segulah of bringing Geulah to the world. That when one just hears the thing from its speaker, but it was not said directly to him, there is no proof from this from Mordechai and Esther since “For there, Mordechai told Esther”.
However, regarding the Lav of “do not rob the impoverished”, it is understood that it is also applicable even when one hears a thing that was said to another person. On the contrary, seemingly, it is more in the scope of “theft” of the speaker, when one hears a thing that was said to another. For the speaker did not intend to say it to him, but rather to another, and it is as if he grabbed it, and said what he heard from others, without mentioning (attributing) the name of the one who said it.
Therefore, one must say that here, it is a manner that there is no prohibition of “do not rob the impoverished”.
3. This can be understood by prefacing, that we find many statements of the Sages, that were not said in in the name of the one who (originally) said them.
This is especially emphasized regarding R’ Eliezer HaGadol. For although,
“he never said a thing that he had not heard from his teacher”,
nevertheless there are numerous statements from him that do not mention the name of his teacher. Why was he not concerned that, “One who does not say a thing in the name of its speaker transgresses a Negative Commandment”?
(Seemingly, one could say according to what it states in the Talmud,
“Rabbi Elazar went and said this matter in the Beit Midrash, but he did not state it in the name of Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Yochanan heard that Rabbi Elazar (omitted mention of his name and) became angry with him etc.. Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Asi visited Rabbi Yochanan, (to placate him) They said to him etc . .
(Rabbi Yaakov bar Idi visited Rabbi Yochanan and said to him: The verse states: “As G-d commanded His servant Moshe, so did Moshe command Joshua etc.”) Now did Joshua, with regard to every matter that he said, say to them: Thus, Moshe said to me? Rather, Joshua would sit and teach Torah without attributing his statements, and everyone would know that it was from the Torah of Moshe. So too, your disciple Rabbi Elazar sits and teaches without attribution, and everyone knows that his teaching is from your instruction. (Hearing this, Rabbi Yochanan was appeased)”.
According to this, one could say that the same applies to R’ Eliezer HaGadol, that he did not need to attribute his words to his teacher, for everyone knew that all his words were from his teacher.
However, it is seemingly problematic to answer this regarding R’ Eliezer HaGadol’s conduct. For he said,
“I have learned much Torah, and I have not taken away from my teachers (רבותי)”
Since he stated “teachers” in the plural, it proves that he had more than one teacher. If so, for each thing, he should have mentioned from which teacher he received it).
Plainly, one could say that the prohibition of “do not rob the impoverished” is plainly similar to theft. For something taken, that is of no concern to the owner, is not considered theft. Similarly, regarding words of Torah – the prohibition is only when the original speaker is particular that one should repeat the statement in his name. However, if he does not care, the prohibition of “do not rob the impoverished” is not extent. Therefore, it is understood that R’ Eliezer did not transgress this, since his teachers were not particular about this.
However, in addition to the difficulty in the essential matter (בעצם הדבר). For seemingly, the teacher should have expressly informed the student that he is not particular, and not rely on the student to deduce this from his own reasoning,
(Moreover: Seemingly, in order to nullify the obligation “to say the thing in the name its (original) speaker”, due to honoring one’s teacher, it is not sufficient that one’s teacher is not particular about this, but rather one must ask permission/forgiveness (in order to do so)).
For this just nullifies the prohibition. However, it is simple that this is not the best practice, and one that is within the confines of the law (מהודר ולפנים משורת הדין). On the contrary, one performs a Mitzvah if one says it in his name, as it states,
“Do not withhold good from the one who needs”
4. It appears that the explanation of this is:
Although R’ Yochanan ben Zakkai, said of his student, R’ Eliezer that he is a,
“cemented cistern that loses not a drop”
It is understood that R’ Eliezer HaGadol did not suffice with knowing the Torah of his teacher, but rather certainly endeavored and delved in understanding matters, until they became intrinsic (נתעצמו) in his intellect and comprehension, in a manner that they were absorbed (שהשתכנע) and understood and became part of his intellect.
If so, when he repeated the aspect, it was not an just aspect of repetition of his teacher’s words, but rather this matter was dictated by his own intellect.
(This is similar to what is explained in many places, regarding the Tannaim and Amoraim, where their rulings corresponded to the root of their souls (ע״פ שורש נשמתם). For example, like the debates of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, where Beit Shammai, whose root is from the level of Gevurah/Severity are strict; and Beit Hillel whose root is from the level of Chasadim/Kindness are lenient.
For seemingly, Torah is not is Heaven. Therefore, how can one rule according to the root of one’s soul? However, their ruling was after contemplation and endeavor of their intellect, as they are in this world, specifically souls in bodies. In other words, they did not suffice with what they received, according to the root of their souls, but rather they endeavored with understanding and comprehension of the matter until they understood that this is so, in their intellect, below in a body)
This aspect, that the Torah concept (דבר תורה), that becomes united with one’s own intellect is considered as if it is his own – is also found in Halacha.
It states in the Talmud that:
“A Teacher who forgoes his honor, his honor is forgone. “And the L-d went before them by day” . . How can these cases be compared? There, with regard to the Holy One, Blessed be He, the world is His and the Torah is His, and therefore He can forgo His honor. By contrast, here, is it his Torah? (It is a question. The honor is dependent upon the Torah, and one cannot forgo the honor of the Torah, that is G-d’s. Rashi).
Rava then said: Yes, if he studies, it is his Torah, as it states: “and in his Torah he meditates day and night” (Ps.1:2)
Rashi writes, “But his desire is in the law of the L-rd, and in His law he meditates”. At first it is “the Torah of the L-rd,” but after he studies and reviews it, it becomes ‘his Torah.’”.
Thus, endeavoring in the Torah study is in a manner that the person has mastery on the Torah until he is able to forgo the honor of Torah.
According to this, the conduct of R’ Eliezer HaGadol is understood in our case. For there is no aspect of “do not rob the impoverished”, for he became a master over the Torah that he learned.
One can now understand why my father, in his explanation of the Zohar on the prohibition of, “do not rob the impoverished” only mentions the aspect of “brings Geulah to the world”. For regarding R’ Chiya, the aspect of “do not rob the impoverished” was not applicable.
(As is proven from this itself that R’ Chiya does not mention the name of the author of the statement until R’ Yose asked him “From who did you hear this from?”).
This is because he endeavored in the matter until he understood the concept in his mind and it became united with him, as aforementioned.
(Similarly, regarding that which my father states, “which we find in (tractate) Chullin Daf 104b, Keritot Daf 23 and Niddah Daf 19, where we learn in the Mishnah the view of the Tanna Kamma, and later the view of R’ Yose. The Talmud there then challenges, “R’ Yose is the Tanna Kamma”. And the Talmud answers ‘this is what the Mishna teaches us: Who is the Tanna Kamma? It is Rabbi Yose. (The identification is important, since) whoever reports a statement in the name of the one who said it brings redemption to the world. As it is states: “And Esther reported it to the king in the name of Mordecai” (Esther 2:22)” . . See Rashi’s comment on tractate Chullin there, that the Tanna forgot and did not mention his name in the beginning, and went back and mentioned his name”.
My father explains that from this itself, that the Tanna forgot, and did not mention his name at the beginning and went back and mentioned his name, it is understood that there was no obligation to mention his name. Moreover, it is understood that certainly there was no prohibition of “do not rob the impoverished”, for as aforementioned, he endeavored until he understood the concept in his intellect).
5. It is understood that the aspect of “one must say a thing in the name in the name its speaker” that is mentioned in the chapter of Tractate Avot – Kinyan Torah, is not the place to state that there is a prohibition, but rather it is an aspect of Middat Chassidut (ethical teachings), like the other aspects of Pirkei Avot.
In other words, it does not speak of cases and Halacha (שמועה והלכה) (and certainly not the study of explanations and reasonings) that one received yet did not incorporate into his mind and intellect – which in such a manner, would obligate one in the matter. Rather, it is in a manner that visibly is a thing that is united in his intellect.
Therefore, the one who says this thing is not because he received it from his teacher, but rather that it is an aspect that is specifically united in his intellect (ענין המיוחד לשכל). So much so, that it is completely his own learning, reasoning and explanation. Nevertheless, even in this, there is a special quality (according to an ethical teaching (מילתא דחסידותא)) to saying a thing in the name of the one who (originally) said it.
One must understand, why, in a case such as this, where a concept is united in one’s intellect, is there an aspect of saying a thing in the name of the one who (originally) said it, even though the statement is not because he heard the matter from the one who said it, but rather because he understood the concept with his own intellect?
On the other hand, since in this case, there is the aspect of “bringing Geulah to the world”, what is the reasoning that when the speaker does not actually say it to him, but rather that he hears it when it is being said to another person, that the Segulah of “bringing Geulah to the world” is absent. (as aforementioned Par. 1)?
6. This can be understood by prefacing an explanation of the aspect of
“one must say a thing in the name of its speaker”
that is first cited in tractate Avot, in the Beraita of Kinyan Torah, which is the last of the forty-eight things that the Torah is acquired with. After this, it states,
“Thus, we have learned: One who says something in the name of its speaker brings redemption to the world, as is states, "And Esther told the king in the name of Mordechai.”
It is understood from this that even though this is an aspect of Middat Chassidut, like the other aspects of Pirkei Avot, and it is not an actual obligation. Nevertheless, this is related to Kinyan Torah. Moreover, from this, that this matter, is counted at the end of the forty-eight things (which are counted from the lightest to the weightiest ) it implies that in the Aspects of Chassidut of Kinyan Torah (שבמילי דחסידותא דקנין תורה), itself, this is a lofty level and quality (and after this it adds an additional quality of “bringing Geulah to the world”).
The explanation of the matter is:
Just as it is with Torah, in general – that the one learning, must know the Masorah (tradition), who received it from who, like the Tanna arranges the tradition in the beginning of tractate Avot, and as Rambam elaborates in his preface to Sefer Yad HaChazakah regarding the forty generations of transmitting the Torah. So too, is it in each particular aspect of Halacha and the reasoning of Halacha – even things that one innovates himself, and so forth. For when we say “from which Beit Midrash, did this innovation come” – this strengthens the aspect of the “Masorah” of Torah.
In other words, it is not just in the words that come from a teaching (שמועה) or Halacha l'Moshe m'Sinai, and so forth. Which in this, there is no innovation that he says it from the one who received this teaching, but even in things that are dependent upon logic, that a superior student innovated through one of the principles (Middot) that the Torah is interpreted with (מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן). Or through reasoning in the depths of the reasons of the Halachot, the foundation and “path of study” (דרך הלימוד) is received from his teacher (and so forth). Therefore, there is an aspect to mention the name of his teacher.
This is the inner reason why it concludes,
“Thus, we have learned: One who says something in the name of its speaker brings redemption to the world”
(for seemingly what reason is there to mention here - “brings Geulah to the world”?)
For the advantage of this is that even these things are said in the name of its speaker. For through this he reveals (redeems/גואל) the hiddenness of all the aspects of the Torah. For the root and truth (שורש ואמיתית) of all the particular Halachot, explanations, and reasonings that are innovated by each and everyone, is in what was said to Moshe at Sinai.
In other words, in addition to the knowledge in general Torah, that he knows its Masorah is from Moshe at Sinai, he redeems all the particulars of Torah concepts (Divrei Torah), through revealing the first author, who is Moshe Rabbeinu, from G-d.
7. According to all this, perhaps one can explain my father’s words,
“According to the simple meaning, one could say that, when must one say the thing in the name of its speaker? when the speaker of the thing, says it to him (directly). Then he must say it in the name of its speaker. . However, if one did not say it (directly) to him, then one is not obligated to say it in the name of its speaker”
In the scope of Torah, there are two things:
“many aspects (were) innovated in the Oral Torah and were just juxtaposed to Scripture”.
So much so that there are “decrees, enactments and customs” (גזירות והתקנות והמנהגות) that completely came from the Sages, until they became Torah specifically through Yisroel. For only things that were disseminated among Yisroel, and the majority of the congregation are able to uphold, became a part of Torah.
This thing is due to the essence of the scope of Torah. For since Torah is not in the Heavens, but was given into the ownership of Yisroel, and the rulings of Torah are according to what is apparent in their intellect, so much so that,
“The Holy One, Blessed be He, smiled and said: My children have triumphed over Me; My children have triumphed over Me “.
Therefore, it is from the boundary of Torah that there are aspects such as this that come in a manner of innovation by the Sages of Yisroel.
These two manners also come in hearing words of Torah, from one’s teacher:
These are two manners in the boundary of Torah:
In this is dependent the scope of “Saying a thing in the name of the one who said it”:
The obligation to say a thing in the name of its speaker, emphasizes (as aforementioned) the aspect of the transmission of the Torah from generation to generation. This thing is when the speaker, specifically says it to him (even when he later ascertains the matter with his intellectual faculties).
The manner where he is not obligated to say a thing in the name of its speaker (even according to aspects of Chassidut) – is when he hears the thing without the speaker speaking directly to him. This comes to teach us this scope of Torah, that comes due to Yisroel adding and innovating in Torah (not through Masorah from generation to generation).
8. According to this, one can explain what my father writes in the continuation of his words. Namely, that the reason that R’ Yose asked “From who did you hear this from?”
“R’ Yose specifically, was particular that they should say a thing in the name of the one who said it. . even if it the speaker did not say it to him, but that he just heard it from the speaker, like it was with R’ Chiya here - where it was not said to R’ Chiya directly, but rather to R’ Acha; and R’ Chiya just heard it.
(And more than this, that “in this homily, R’ Chiya inferred from it (מבין דבר מתוך דבר) . . R’ Chiya innovated on his own”, as my father writes here).
Nevertheless, one must also “say a thing in the name of the one who said it”, Therefore he asked “From who did you hear this from?”
He explains that “R’ Yose‘s level is similar to the level of Esther. For Esther is the level of Malchut and so too, R’ Yose is the level of Malchut”.
The explanation of the matter is:
Sefirat Malchut is the end of all the levels, that possesses nothing of its own (סוף כל דרגין, דלית לה מגרמא כלום). Therefore, it emphasizes that even all the innovations that come from Yisroel are from G-d. On the contrary, from a very lofty level, due to that which Yisroel and G-d are entirely one.
From this reason itself, there comes the story regarding R’ Yose, who in the beginning, did not say from whom he heard it, except after R’ Yose asked “From who did you hear this from?”
(So too, with regarding to the Mishnah in Chullin, Keritot and Niddah, where it teaches in the Mishnah the view of the Tanna Kamma and afterward the view of R’ Yose – where the Tanna does not mention his name in the beginning and goes back and mentions his name,
“this is what the Mishna teaches us: Who is the Tanna Kamma? It is Rabbi Yose“).
For due to the level of revelation (הגילוי) as it is according to the order of descent (Seder HaHishtalshelut) of Torah
(both in the exoteric part (Niglah) of Torah, as well as the esoteric part (Pnimiyut HaTorah in the Zohar)
the aspect of Masorah is not extent. Rather its aspect is completely due to the innovation of Yisroel, and solely due to R’ Yose – the level of Malchut, is it felt as if it is due to Atzmut - that even the innovation is due to the receiver (המקבל). The power of the innovation itself is from G-d, as aforementioned.
Msichas Shabbat Parshat Tisa 5740, Shabbat Parshat