Loading...
 

Vol 32.18 - Kedoshim 1               Spanish French Audio  Video

Hebrew Text:

Page 112   Page113   Page114   Page115   Page116   Page117   Page118   Page119  

Rambam  Bava_Kamma  Bava_Metzia

Summary:
 (5749)  "Whenever a person robs a colleague of even a p'rutah's worth, he is considered as if he took his very soul
 (Rambam Hil Gezelah va'Avedah 1:13) The differences bewtween Rambam and Talmud (Bava Kamma 199a). 

 Dispute and many aspects of the reason that theft is "as if he took his very soul"; Explanation of the
 continuation of Rambam in this Halacha regarding laws of repentance (for robbers)

 

Translation:

1. Rambam writes (Hil Gezelah va'Avedah 1:13)

"Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth (the minutest value), is considered as if he took his very soul, as Proverbs 1:19 states: "Such are the ways of those who are greedy. They take away the soul of the owner."

According to the simple meaning the source of his words are from the statement of R’ Yochanan in Bava Kamma (119a).

However, the Talmud there continues:

“And it states: “And they shall consume your harvest, and your bread, (they shall consume) your sons and your daughters” (Jeremiah 5:17)

And it states: “(Egypt shall be a desolation, and Edom shall be a desolate wilderness,) for the extortion of the children of Judah, because they have shed innocent blood in their land” (Joel 4:19).

And it states (with regard to a famine): “And the Lord said: It is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he put to death the Gibeonites” (II Samuel 21:1)”

The Talmud explains:

Since R’ Yochanan’s point was proven by the first verse, what was the purpose of adding each subsequent verse by saying: And it states?

The Gemara answers: And if you would say that the robber takes only his, i.e., the victim’s, life, but the lives of his sons and daughters are not taken, come and hear the second verse, which mentions the flesh of his sons and daughters.

And if you would say: This matter applies only where the robber does not give his victim compensation for the stolen item, (but where he gave compensation for the stolen item, it is not comparable to murder), come and hear the verse: “For the extortion of the children of Judah, because they have shed innocent blood in their land.” (Note: Extortion is referring to coercing someone to sell an item that he does not want to sell. It is a form of robbery, and the verse equates it with murder).

And if you would say: This matter applies only where he committed the robbery by direct action, but if he committed it through indirect action, the transgression is not as severe, come and hear the verse: “It is for Saul, and for his bloody house etc.”

This requires explanation:

Why doesn’t Rambam cite the continuation of the Talmud, that a robber etc. is if he shed the blood of his sons and daughters, and that this prohibition also applies to extortion, and even indirect action?

In simplicity, one could say that the continuation of R’ Yochanan’s statement is not cited in terms of Halacha but rather as words of homily that emphasize the severity of the sin of robbery. Therefore, Rambam does not cite them, for this is not his goal in Sefer Yad HaChazakah - which is a sefer of Halachot – to cite all the homilies regarding the severity of the prohibition of robbery.

 However, Rambam’s words, prove that he maintains that R’ Yochanan‘s statement that “Whoever robs etc.” is stated for the purpose of Halacha. For in the continuation of this statement, he writes (and this is especially so since he writes it in the same Halacha).

Nevertheless, if the article that was taken by robbery no longer exists, and a robber seeks to repent and comes of his ownership volition to return the value of the article he obtained by robbery, our Sages ordained that one should not accept it. Instead, the robber should be helped and forgiven, to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return. Our Sages did not look favorably on anyone who accepts payment for an article that was taken from him through robbery”.

In other words, Rambam cites this statement, not (just) in order to explanation the severity of the prohibition of robbery,

(And to note that if this was indeed Rambam’s intent, he should have brought this statement, immediately in the beginning of Hilchot Gezelah, or at the conclusion, as is his style in such cases)

but rather in connection with the Halacha of “Takanat Shavim” (the enactment to encourage robbers to repent / תקנת השבים)

Therefore, one must say that Rambam maintains that this severity in the prohibition of robbery (“באיסור גזילה”) (“as if took his very soul etc.”) is an aspect of Halacha.

Therefore, why does he not bring that this is also with extortion, and through indirect action

(and also that this is “as if he took his very soul”)?

2. This can be explained by prefacing an explanation into the reason of the matter, that “Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth is as if he took his very soul”:

For Tosafot writes in another place that it is:

“Sometimes hunger is severe, and he (the victim) has nothing with to buy (food)”

In other words, this law of, “Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth is as if he took his very soul” refers to a situation where the victim is lacking “so much”, that in a condition of “extreme hunger” he would literally be saving his life with this prutah, and thus we find that the theft is able to cause the actual taking of his life.

(It is understood that it is not logical, at all, to say that the intent of Tosafot is, that since there may sometime be a condition (that is not common, at all) that the robbery should cause the taking of his life,

(As he states, “hunger is severe, and he has nothing with to buy food”),

therefore, “Whoever robs . . even a prutah is considered as if he took his very soul”!

Moreover:

Tosafot‘s intent in this is to resolve the words of the Talmud:

“Greater is the transgression of verbal mistreatment than the transgression of monetary exploitation”

And Rabbi Elazar explains:

“This, verbal mistreatment, affects one’s body; but that, monetary exploitation, affects one’s money”

In other words, that even though, “Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth, is considered as if he took his very soul”, the reason that “Whoever robs etc.”, is because that sometimes there is severe hunger and he does not have the means to purchase food. “However, there are many people who are not lacking so much”.

This proves that Tosafot maintains that, R’ Yochanan’s words “is considered as if he took his very soul”, is not said regarding all robbery. For on the contrary, regarding “many people” it is not applicable to say so, Therefore, “Greater is the transgression of verbal mistreatment than the transgression of monetary exploitation. . This, verbal mistreatment, affects one’s body; but that, monetary exploitation, affects (just) one’s money”)

 However, it is impossible to explain Rambam’s words so. For he expressly writes, “Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth, he is considered as if he took his very soul”, which implies that it refers to all manner of robbery.

(Regarding Tosafot‘s view, seemingly, one must say that their version of the Talmud was “one who steals from his fellow” (הגוזל לחבירו) and not “Whoever robs etc.” (כל הגוזל). This is explicitly cited there in Tosafot: “It says in Perek HaGozel Basra (119a) one who steals from his fellow etc) (והא דאמרינן פרק הגוזל בתרא הגוזל לחבירו כו)

Moreover:

According to Tosafot’s view one must say that although it says,

One who robs a colleague . .is considered as if he took his very soul”

It is not necessarily so (לאו דוקא). For the same Halacha also applies to one who robs a colleague of even a prutah worth.

For this reason “that sometimes hunger is severe, and he has nothing with to buy food” also applies to theft (גניבה). In any manner it is as if he takes his very soul.

This is proven from Tosafot‘s question on the words of the Talmud:

“Greater is the transgression of verbal mistreatment than the transgression of monetary exploitation. . This, verbal mistreatment, affects one’s body; but that, monetary exploitation, affects (just) one’s money”)

which is speaking of monetary exploitation. Therefore, one must say that Tosafot maintains that even one who exploits his fellow (המאנה את חבירו) the sum of a prutah, is as if he takes his soul.

Whereas, according to Rambam’s view, since Rambam writes plainly (like the wording of the Talmud) “Whoever robs a colleague etc.” (and brings it in Hilchot Gezelah) implies that it refers just to robbery and not to other manners of taking his fellow’s money.

(This difficulty also exits if we explain Rambam’s view, that the reason that “Whoever robs . . is considered as if he took his very soul” is (like the commentators write):

Because “the money . . is also considered like one of the parts (of his body) (אחד מחלקיו). . like the Sages state many times that whoever robs his fellow of even a prutah worth is as if he takes his very soul .. regarding Tzaddikim, their money is more precious to them than their bodies” (Note: For since they do not stretch out their hands to partake of stolen property. Therefore, their own property is very precious to them)

(This is especially so according to the words of the Alter Rebbe regarding Tzedaka that when a person give Tzedaka that it is as if “he is actually giving his soul’s life to G‑d”, “since he could have purchased with this money (that he gave for charity), sustenance for the life of his vital soul”)

For even according to this explanation, there is no difference between robbery and theft or other forms of taking one’s fellow’s money. For since he is losing his money which is “like one of his parts”, it is considered as if “takes his very soul”)

3. There is, seemingly, a place to explain the reason of the matter according to what Rambam writes in the previous Halachot:

“Desire leads to coveting and coveting leads to robbery. For if the owners do not desire to sell despite the offer of much money and many supplications by friends, the person motivated by desire will be moved to robbery, as Micha 2:2 states: "They coveted houses and stole. And if the owner stands up against them to save his property, or in another way prevents the person motivated by desire from robbing, he will be moved to murder. “

On this foundation, Rambam adds:

“Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth, he is considered as if he took his very soul”

For since robbery is able to lead to shedding of blood, therefore, the Torah says that immediately from the time of the robbery, the boundary of “as if he took his very soul“, applies to him.

In other words:

The reason that “Whoever robs . . is considered as if he took his very soul” is not because the act of this robbery itself causes the actual shedding of blood.

(Like the view of Tosafot, that, “Sometimes hunger is severe, and he has nothing with to buy”)

Rather it is because the act of robbery is able to cause the deed of shedding of blood. Therefore, the act of robbery itself is considered like the act of shedding of blood.

(Therefore, this law is just with robbery (גזילה). For the existence of the owner standing before him to save his money or to prevent the robbery, in a manner that will come to shedding of blood, is – “generally” with robbery and not theft and other forms of taking money).

 However, it is difficult to explain that this is Rambam’s intent, for:

  1. If Rambam’s intent is that these Halachot are a continuation of the same subject from one aspect to the other. Namely, that when one prohibited deed causes another prohibited deed, that the first deed is as if it includes the deed that occurred through it. If so, Rambam should have stated first “coveting leads to robbery”, and so forth. Similar to what he states afterward “Whoever robs . . is considered as if he took his very soul”. Since Rambam solely states, “Whoever robs etc.”, it implies that this is a special aspect that is specifically related to the prohibition of robbery.
  2. Why does Rambam use the wording, “as if he took his very soul”, and changes from the wording, “shedding of blood”, that are used in the previously Halacha?
  3. From the manner of the division of the Halachot in Rambam, it appears that the reason that “Whoever robs a colleague . . is considered as if he took his very soul”, is not a continuation and conclusion of the previously Halacha

(Like the previous Halacha to this – “Thus, we learn that a person who desires another person's property violates one negative commandment etc.”)

but rather a new matter.

4. Therefore, it appears that Rambam maintains that the reason that it is, “as if he took his very soul”, is not because the act of the robbery is destined to come to (actual) shedding of blood , but due to the essential deed of taking “a fellow’s money by force”, against the will of the owners.

Taking “a person’s money by force” is not just the deed of taking a person’s money, but rather that this deed nullifies and removes (מבטל ומפקיע) the person’s ownership from his possessions. Therefore, this is “as if he took his very soul”. And we derive this from the verse “They take away the soul of the owner”. For since his ownership of this article is removed through robbery, this is “as if he took his very soul”.

This principle is in, “Whoever robs a colleague of even a prutah worth”, regardless whether his fellow is poor or wealthy.

(it is just that if it is less than a prutah worth, for there is nothing less than a prutah worth of money, it is not considered “as if he took his very soul”. Since in this manner he does not nullify the ownership of the “possessions” (רכוש),

However, it is understood that this is only regarding robbery or other forms of monetary exploitation.

(According to Rambam, this is not included in that of Bava Metzia where the transgression of verbal mistreatment is greater than the transgression of monetary exploitation

(for this, verbal mistreatment, affects one’s body; but that, monetary exploitation, affects (just) one’s money”)

For this is just applies to monetary exploitation, and not with “Whoever robs his fellow”.)

According to this, one can answer why Rambam does not bring the continuation of the words of the Talmud that also refer to the lives of his sons and daughters and also extortion, and even indirect action.

For Rambam maintains that the essence of the law is derived just from the first verse “They take away the soul of the owner”.

R’ Yocḥanan’s intent in citing the other verses is just to add additional severity that only applies under specific conditions:

  • If the victim has children, where it is possible that they die as a result of this theft – then “their death” is attributed to the robber.
  • A special innovation regarding extortion, that is not from that category of “as if he took his very soul” like in robbery. For since the victim gives the money, and the extortioner does not just take it against the will of the owners, it does not nullify, through this (so much) the ownership of the person on his money.

(On the contrary, it recognizes his ownership. Therefore, he gives the money)

  • Causation, - when he indirectly causes actual death, that the death is accorded to him. Alternatively, when through his deed, he causes the deprivation (לקפח) of all the source of the life of the other (like with the Gibeonites).

Therefore, Rambam does not cite these details and verses. For he brings just what is related to the essence of the main act of robbery

(Even robbery that is a prutah worth, which is thing that is equal (in all cases) (without additional conditions). In other words, the entire “act of robbery” that the prohibition of “do not steal” applies to, applies to him also the severity of “as if he took his very soul”, due to the actual taking of the money of the person by force.

5. According to all the aforementioned, one can also explain Rambam’s words in conjunction to this Halacha:

“Notwithstanding the severity of this sin, if the article that was taken by robbery no longer exists, and a robber seeks to repent and comes of his ownership volition to return the value of the article he obtained by robbery, our Sages ordained that one should not accept it. Instead, the robber should be helped and forgiven, to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return. Our Sages did not look favorably on anyone who accepts payment for an article that was taken from him through robbery”.

For seemingly it is not understood:

In this chapter, many Halachot earlier, Rambam already cited concerning “Takanat Shavim“, that:

“Even if a person robbed a beam and used it in building a house, since the beam remained unchanged, Scriptural Law requires that he tear down the entire building and return the beam to its owner,. Nevertheless, our Sages ordained, to encourage robbers to repent, that the robber pay the worth of the beam and that the building not be destroyed”.

Therefore, one must examine why Rambam writes this detail of Takanat Shavim (when the stolen article does not exist) after many Halachot and he does not write it previously, in continuation to the enactment of the Sages (Takanat Shavim) that the building is not destroyed?

However, according to the aforementioned, one could explain, that this is because the details of this Takanat Shavim (as Rambam elaborates):

  1. That is only refers to when the stolen article no longer exists (כשאין הגזילה קיימת)
  2. That the robber wants to repent
  3. Additionally – that “he comes of his volition to return the value of the article (he obtained by robbery),
  4. That not only do we not accept it from him but rather that “the robber should be helped and forgiven, to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return”

is related to the aforementioned boundary in the prohibition of robbery, that it is “as if he took his very soul”, due to the essential deed of taking the object “by force”, against the will of the owners.

The explanation of the matter is:

One could say that Rambam’s intent in the continuation of his words in this Halacha:

"Whoever robs . . is considered as if he took his very soul . . Nevertheless

is that it is

(not just to explanation, that since robbery is as severe as shedding of blood, that there is a supposition that the repenting of the robber is very severe, and therefore, it comes to teach us the principle of Takanat Shavim, that they were lenient in it. rather more than this)

to explain the main aspect and boundary (עיקרה וגדרה) of Takanat Shavim (as will be explained Par. 6)

For seemingly, there is a place to wonder:

Regarding the monetary damage through the act of robbery, there is a place for this enactment. For money is given for forgiveness on behalf of the victim (הנגזל)

(and also Beit Din has the power to re-assign money).

However, since the act of robbery is considered “as if he took his very soul”, how can the Sages enact that one should forgo the returning of the stolen article, when the forgiveness of money (מחילת ממון), does not have the power to nullify that which the act of robbery is “as if he took his very soul”?

This puzzlement is alluded to in Rambam by his writing:

“Whoever robs . . is considered as if he took his very soul . . Nevertheless

In other words, since the act of robbery is “as if he took his very soul”, therefore, it is seemingly a great innovation in that which the Sages enacted that, “we do not accept it from him”.

To address this, in continuation Rambam writes many details pertaining to this enactment. Namely, that just under these certain conditions, is there a place for this enactment, since the act of robbery is like murder, as will be explained.

6. The first condition is that Takanat Shavim is ordained just when the article does not exist. However, it the article exists, one must return the article that he stole.

The reason for this is:

The return of the stolen article, itself, has the power to rectify the sin from its root. Whereas, when one pays money, and does not return the stolen article, it just rectifies the victim’s loss of money (הממון של הנגזל), but not actual sin (גוף העבירה).

(This is similar to the prohibition of robbery, as is understood from Rambam’s words in the beginning of Hilchot Gezelah regarding the reason that we do not give lashes,

“Because it can be corrected by the fulfillment of a positive commandment. For if a person robs, he is obligated to return what he obtained by robbery . . Even if the robber burned the object that he obtained by robbery, he is not punished by lashing, because he remains obligated to pay its value. And whenever the transgression of a negative commandment results in a financial penalty, it is not punished by lashing”

In other words, when one returns the actual article that was stolen, he rectifies the prohibition (retroactively). Whereas, when he repays the worth of the article, he does not rectify the prohibition, and just rectifies the financial loss).

Therefore, when the stolen article exists, it is possible to rectify the sin by returning this object that was “as if he took his very soul”. For by returning the actual article to its owner, as it was before the robbery, it is as if he “returns his soul”, that he took from him through the act of robbery.

(It is just that if he builds the beam in his house, where there is a concern that if he is not allowed to pay its worth, that he will not do Teshuvah, at all, the Sages enacted a special enactment. For it is better that he, at least, pay the article‘s worth to rectify the financial loss, than not return the article, at all)

 However, if “the article does not exist”, for then, even when he pays its worth, it is impossible to nullify that which he took his soul from him, then there is a place for Takanat Shavim, that they should not accept the worth of the stolen article

According to this, the other aforementioned details are also resolved:

In rectifying the act of robbery, there are two things:

  • The rectification of the sin, on behalf of the victim (מצד הנפעל)

(or to explain it in another manner, on behalf of the one whom the article was stolen from), and

  • Its rectification on behalf of the aggressor (הפועל) (of the robber).

That, which through paying the worth of the stolen article, the deed of the sin is not rectified,

(Namely, that which he took his soul from him),

pertains to the victim (the one whom the article was stolen from). For since the robber did not return his article to him, and the article is missing, the act of robbery, and its result, is not nullified

(For the taking by force, against his will, is like murder)

Whereas, on the behalf of the robber, when he admits with all his heart etc., regarding the ownership of his fellow over his possessions, and expresses his remorse etc., at least from his perspective, there is a rectification to the deed of taking the life of his fellow.

This is why Rambam writes that specifically when:

“The robber seeks to repent and comes of his own volition to return the value of the article he obtained by robbery

That in this instance, he rectifies (on his own behalf) the deed of taking the article against the will of the owners. Therefore, the Sages stated that, due to Takanat Shavim, one should not accept the worth of the article from him. For only then, nothing will be lacking from the rectification of the possible sin, in a situation where the article does not exist, and the robber did all in his power to rectify the deed.

(Whereas if the robber did not come of his own volition to do Teshuvah, and to return the worth of the stolen article, they did not enact that the owner should not accept even the worth of the stolen article from him (even if the victim wants to forgive him). For he did not do all in his ability to rectify his act of robbery.)

This aspect is emphasized by Rambam also in the conclusion of his words, that,

“the robber should be helped and forgiven, to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return”.

The intent in Takanat Shavim is not (just) a generic leniency (סתם קולא),

(like the case of where one builds the stolen beam in his house, where we are concerned that he may not do Teshuvah, at all).

but rather (also) a help (עזר) in order to rectify his sin,

“to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return”, that he truly repent and with a complete heart”.

7. From this Halacha, one can learn a wonderful lesson in “improving one's character” (תיקון הדעות), in the general Avodah of “to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return”.

If the Sages ordained that a person should forgive another for the loss of his money, because it is in order “to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return”. How much more so (כ"ש וק"ו) then, must the endeavoring to draw close Yisroel to their Father in Heaven, be in a manner that it is clear to the one occupied in this (as well as to the other), that there is no intent of profit (physical profit or even spiritual profit).

Rather, his entire intent is to draw him close to the correct path.

Moreover, when the endeavoring in this causes him “loss” – a physical loss

(Like the literal loss, in our case, where he does not accept the worth of his stolen article)

or even a spiritual loss, where he lowers and humbles himself to endeavor even with one who is applicable to “take his soul” – specifically then, are the Sages’ spirit pleased from him (רוח חכמים נוחה ממנו).

As it states in the verse, “He tells His words to Jacob, His statutes and His judgments to Israel.”, namely that even G-d’s conduct is in this manner.

That when the “robber

(for a sinner is called one who steals from his father and mother)

(Note: Berachot 35a: Rabbi Chanina bar Pappa said: Anyone who derives benefit from this world without a blessing, it is as if he stole from G-d and the community of Israel, as it is stated: “Whoever robs his father and his mother and says: It is no transgression, he is the companion of a destroyer” (Proverbs 28:24). The phrase, his father, refers to none other than G-d, as it is stated: “Is He not your Father Who created you, Who made you and established you” (Deuteronomy 32:6). The phrase his mother refers to none other than the community of Israel, as it is stated: “Hear, my son, the discipline of your father, and do not forsake the Torah of your mother” (Proverbs 1:8)).

wishes to do Teshuvah” – that G-d lowers himself, as it were, to the person who sins, and helps him and forgives him, in order to “to make the path of repentance more accessible to those who wish to return.

Then – when Yisroel does Teshuva - they are redeemed immediately, with the true and complete Geulah, soon mamosh.

MSichas Shabbat Parshat Bereshit 5748

Links:
 
Date Delivered:   Reviewer:       
Date Modified:    Date Reviewed:  
Contributor: