Vol 32.07 - Chag HaPesach Spanish French Audio Video
Debate between Rambam and Raavad (Hil Chametz and Matza 8:8) if we dip the Matzah in Charoset.
Explanation of the Tzafnat Paneach in the reason that Raavad did not disagree with the words of Rambam before this (ibid 6 on the halacha) that during Temple times: “one should wrap matzah and maror together, dip them in the charoset”.
And the reasoning of his words that during Temple times everyone agreed that we dipped matzah in charoset;
Explanation of the aspect of charoset and the particulars of its laws according to Pnimiyut (10)
1. Rambam writes (in Hilchot Chametz and Matza (8:8)):
“At present.. after one recites the blessing, ‘hamotzi lechem’, one then recites the blessing, ‘al achilat Matzah’, dips the Matzah in Charoset, and eats it”.
This is also the view of R’ Amram Gaon, R’ Yitzchak Ibn Gayyat - (b. 1030) and others,
(as is cited in the Maggid Mishnah here)
that we dip the Matzah in Charoset.
However, Raavad disputes this and writes,
“This is folly” (הבל)
Also, the Tur writes on this view,
“I do not know the reason for this dipping in Charoset etc.”
In addition, the Baal HaManhig (R’ Avraham ben Nathan (cir. 1200) questions these words, that Matzah is a remembrance for freedom, and Charoset is a remembrance for the mortar, and says ‘how can you join these together’”?
The Bach answers that:
“There is somewhat of a support for their words since we learn in the Mishnah:
‘They brought before him Matzah, Chazeret and Charoset, and two cooked dishes (in honor of the Festival), even though eating Charoset is not a Mitzvah. R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok says: it is a Mitzvah to eat Charoset’.
It is a question in what they differ. For since everyone admits that one must bring Charoset, what is the difference whether it is a Mitzvah or not. For certainly, even according to R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok, we do not make a blessing on the Charoset even though it is a Mitzvah ,as the Tur writes subsequently (since it is subordinate to the Maror). Rather, certainly according to the Tanna Kamma who maintains that it is not a Mitzvah, and it is not brought except due to the poison (in the bitter herbs which is neutralized by the Charoset), it is not needed except for the Maror and the vegetables (וירקות). However according to R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok that it is a Mitzvah, in remembrance for the mortar. If so, it is required even for the Matzah. And since Rambam in Chapter 7 rules like the R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok, that it is Mitzvah. Therefore, he also rules that the Matzah is dipped in Charoset. Regarding the Baal HaManhig’s question that Matzah is a remembrance for freedom and Charoset a remembrance for the mortar etc., one can say that our intent is to show, with this dipping, that we were taken out from slavery, which is from mortar, of which Charoset is a remembrance for, to freedom that the Matzah is a remembrance for”.
According to this, one could seemingly say that the Raavad rules like the Tanna Kamma, that Charoset is not a Mitzvah, and is not brought except due to the poison and is not necessary except for the Maror. Therefore, there is no place to dip the Matzah in Charoset.
However, it is difficult to explain that the dispute of Rambam and the Raavad, is whether the Halacha is like R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok,
(that Charoset is a Mitzvah since it is a remembrance for the mortar)
or whether the Halacha is like the Sages,
(that it is not a Mitzvah and only comes due to the poison) –
For if so, why doesn’t Raavad dispute Rambam:
He should have said there that it is not so, and that the Halacha is that it is only due to the poison?!
2. Seemingly, one could explain this by prefacing that which the Alter Rebbe writes in his Shulchan Aruch,
“(The Sages also) ordained that Charoset be before a person when (he is) reciting the Haggadah. For Charoset is a commemoration of the mortar with which our ancestors toiled with in Egypt etc.. Therefore, it must be on the table when telling of the enslavement in Egypt”.
Further on, in a separate section, he writes,
“We do not dip in Charoset except as a Mitzvah, for it recalls the mortar”.
It is apparent from his words that there are two separate laws in Charoset:
For the first law - the binging it to the table, and that it should be on the table while reciting the Haggadah, is not relevant to the dipping with it. Therefore, the Alter Rebbe does not mention it in the law of bringing it to the table which is for the purpose of the dipping.
This is also proven from what the Alter Rebbe writes further on (in that chapter - 473) regarding bringing the vegetables with all the things:
“it is desirable that he arrange them on the (Seder) plate in a manner that will not require him to bypass any of the Mitzvot. In other words, the vegetables should be closer to him than the Matzah; the Matzah closer than the Maror and the Charoset; and the Maror and Charoset closer than the two cooked foods.
There are some who do not object to the Charoset and the two cooked foods being closer to (the person reciting the Haggadah). For since (these items) are only brought to the table as a mere remembrance, the concern regarding ‘passing over Mitzvot’, does not apply to them”.
Thus, the Alter Rebbe equates the Charoset to the two cooked foods - that their being brought to the table is (not for eating but rather) just as a “mere remembrance” - that they should be on the table at the time one recites the Haggadah.
Seemingly, this concurs with Rambam’s view. For in Chapter 7:11 he writes,
“The Charoset is a Mitzvah ordained by the words of the Sages (מדברי סופרים), to commemorate the mortar with which (our forefathers) worked in Egypt. . This is placed on the table on (the first two) nights of Pesach.”
And he does not mention regarding dipping with it, and its eating etc. In other words, that the Mitzvah is solely to bring it on the table. However, in our version - in chap 8:8 - he speaks regarding the dipping with it.
According to this, one could say that, according to the view of the Bach, the dispute between the Sages and R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok, whether Charoset is a Mitzvah or whether it is due to the poison, is just regarding the law of dipping in Charoset. However, according to all, there is a Mitzvah to bring Charoset on the table at the time of reciting the Haggadah, in remembrance of the mortar.
Therefore, the Raavad does not disagree, previously in Chapter 7,
(regarding the law of the Mitzvah of placing Charoset on the table)
rather just in Chapter 8 – regarding the law of dipping the Matzah in Charoset.
However, notwithstanding this, it is extremely difficult to say that according to the Sages, there is a Mitzvah to bring Charoset on the table.
(For from their plain wording.
“They brought before him Matzah, Chazeret and Charoset, and two cooked dishes, even though eating Charoset is not a Mitzvah”
it appears that they maintain that there is no Mitzvah in Charoset, at all).
For the essence of the aforementioned explanation,
(that the dispute between Rambam and the Raavad is whether the Halacha is like the Sages or R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok)
For if it is because of this, the Raavad should not have written on Rambam’s words, “this is folly”? Just because Rambam rules like R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok, is this “folly”?
Therefore, it appears that even the Raavad maintains that the dipping in Charoset is a Mitzvah that is Rabbinical (מד״ס) as a remembrance of the mortar – like the words of the R’ Eliezer ben Tzadok.
(Therefore, he does not dispute Rambam’s words, previously in Chapter 7, as aforementioned)
Notwithstanding this, Raavad maintains that there is no place for dipping Matzah in Charoset.
3. The Tzafnat Paneach explains the dispute between Rambam and Raavad in another manner:
“Look in the objections (of the Raavad) and the Maggid Mishnah (ובהה״מ). Regarding Matzah there are two reasons for the Mitzvah of eating them:
One, because it is a remembrance for the oppression and another, because it is a remembrance of freedom . . and regarding Maror, there is just one reason, because of servitude. The Charoset is also because of servitude. In the time of the Mikdash, they certainly also dipped the Matzah in Charoset. However, in our time, since we see that the Mitzvah, of remembering servitude, is nullified, since Maror in our time is Rabbinical. It is just that Maror was enacted because of remembrance. However, Matzah did not require an enactment since the reason of freedom still remains, Biblically. Therefore, dipping in Charoset is not applicable. On this, Rambam argues with Raavad, whether a Rabbinical enactment is relevant when, without this, a Biblical obligation is applicable.”
The Tzafnat Paneach’s intent is (also) to explain why the Raavad‘s dispute is just on the law of dipping Matzah in Charoset in Halacha 8. And not on the law of dipping Matzah in Charoset, before this in Rambam, where it is speaking (in Halacha 6) regarding the law of eating Matzah and Maror, in the time of the Temple.
These are his words,
“Afterwards, he wraps Matzah and Maror together as one, dips it in Charoset etc.”
The Raavad just argues there on Rambam’s words,
“he wraps Matzah and Maror together as one”
(that “this like Hillel. However, he is not precise in the order”)
however, not on the dipping in Charoset.
(One should not say that Rambam’s words, “he dips it in Charoset” just refer to the Maror (of the Korech) and not on the Matzah.
For from Rambam’s plain wording
(“and he dips it in Charoset”) (and not “and he dips the Maror in Charoset”)
it shows that he dips everything in the Charoset.
Rambam continues after this:
“If he eats Matzah separately and Maror separately, he recites a blessing for the former in its own right and the latter in its own right”.
And Rambam does not differentiate between them regarding the aspect of dipping in Charoset. Namely, that when one eats them separately (and does not wrap them in the Korech sandwich) he just dips the Maror in Charoset and not the Matzah)
This is what is problematic to the Tzafnat Paneach regarding Raavad’s words – why does he not dispute in Halacha 6, regarding the dipping of the Matzah in Charoset?
From this, the Tzafnat Paneach precisely notes, that in the time of the Mikdash, no one disagreed that they dip the Matzah in Charoset. For in the time of the Mikdash there existed, within Matzah, also a remembrance for the oppression (עוני)
(and therefore, it was fitting to dip the Matzah in Charoset which is remembrance to the mortar).
The dispute between Rambam and Raavad is just regarding Matzah, in our time. For from the Torah’s standpoint, the remembrance for the servitude that exists within the Matzah, is nullified.
(for Maror, in this time, is not Biblical).
There just remains the remembrance for freedom. In this, they argue whether there is a place to say that there was a specific enactment of the Sages, that Matzah, in our time, should also be a remembrance for the servitude.
(like they enacted for mortar, in our time):
However, his explanation of Rambam’s view requires understanding:
For what aspect is there in this enactment, that Matzah should also have a remembrance for servitude. For they are not innovating (with this enactment) any new deed in the essential eating of the Matzah. (except for the dipping in Charoset, for which they are ruling).
For in any event, we are required to eat Matzah
(not like Maror, where they enacted the eating of Maror as a remembrance of servitude),
and there is not added in the Matzah, except another reason for its eating.
(Seemingly, this is not similar to the examples that the Tzafnat Paneach brings there, like
“that of Berachot (26a) . . regarding,
For there, through the enactment of the Sages, the new term of impurity (שם טומאה) applies ( the lesser form of impurity, that is Rabbinical).
A semblance of this, is with the other examples in Tzafnat Paneach there. However, in our case, there is, seemingly, not being added, any deed or the application of law (חלות דין) over the Matzah, through this enactment).
4. Apparently, one could explain this, by prefacing the reasoning of the Tzafnat Paneach‘s aforementioned words that, in our time,
“The remembering servitude, is nullified, since Maror in our time is Rabbinical”
For seemingly, the reason that the Mitzvah of Maror in our time is not Biblical, is because the eating of Maror is subordinate (טפלה) to Pesach and is not an independent Mitzvah. Rather, it is considered a thing that “facilitates the consumption of the Korban Pesach” (כמכשירי הפסח). Therefore, in our time, where there is no Korban Pesach, the Mitzvah of Maror is not Biblical (as Rambam writes).
However, what is the proof from this that, in our time, the entire reason of remembrance of servitude, is nullified? Even in the essence of the aspect, it is difficult to understand – for why should it be so, that specifically in our time (when the Beit HaMikdash does not exist) should the remembrance of the servitude be nullified and that there should remain, just the remembrance of freedom?
One could say that the explanation of this is:
Regarding the Mitzvah of this night, there are two general obligations of the remembrance of Yetziat Mitzrayim:
The essence of both of them, is to make known our Geulah and freedom – both through the telling of Yetziat Mitzrayim in speech, as well as through deeds and the obligations of this night - the eating of Pesach, Matzah and Maror.
Just as it is regarding the telling of the exodus of Egypt in speech, that one must begin base roots (בגנות).
“One by stating that we were slaves to Pharaoh in Egypt and (describing) all the evil done to us, and concludes with the miracles and wonders that were wrought upon us, and our freedom”,
Similarly, it is also regarding the remembrance of freedom in the deeds of this night. Namely, that one must emphasize, in it, the harsh servitude and subjugation from which came the Geulah.
Therefore, there must also be the eating of the Maror,
“(They are eaten) because the Egyptians embittered the lives of our ancestors in Egypt.”
Only through this, does one fulfill the Mitzvah of freedom (of Pesach and Matzah) completely.
(This is also the explanation of the words that Maror is a part of the Mitzvot of the eating of Pesach and is considered as a preparation to the Pesach (כמכשירי הפסח).
For the fulfillment of the Mitzvah of eating the Pesach
“(It is eaten) because the Omnipresent passed over the houses of our ancestors in Egypt”
is complete, specifically when it is together with the eating of Maror, “because the Egyptians embittered etc.”).
According to this, one can “sweeten” (להמתיק) the Bach’s words (that were cited above) in the resolution to the question of the Manhig,
(that Matzah is a remembrance for freedom; and Charoset is a remembrance for the mortar, and how can one join them together)
“that our intent is to show, with this dipping, that we were taken out from slavery, which is from mortar, of which Charoset is a remembrance for, to freedom that the Matzah is a remembrance for”.
In other words, that the aspect of the freedom and the aspect of the servitude are connected together. For through the remembrance of the servitude (the mortar) it adds to the remembrance of the freedom, that G-d brought us out from servitude to Geulah.
5. The scope of the telling of the exodus of Egypt - in speech, and the conduct of freedom - in deed are not just to remember that our forefathers were slaves, and that they were redeemed. Rather that this servitude and Geulah is relevant to the person himself.
For just as in the telling of the exodus of Egypt,
“One begins by informing that we were slaves to Pharaoh. . and concludes with the miracles . . that were wrought for us, and our freedom”,
Similarly, it is in the freedom of the deed, as Rambam writes:
“In each and every generation, a person must present himself as if he, himself, has now left the slavery of Egypt. . Regarding this manner, G-d commanded in the Torah: "Remember that you were a slave (Deut. 5:15)" - i.e., as if you, yourself, were a slave and went out to freedom and were redeemed.”
The obligation of doing all the deeds of this night, in a manner of freedom, is not just as an external sign (סימן), but rather that it is an obligation. For through these deeds, a person feels himself to be a free person (בן חורין), that
“went out to freedom and were redeemed”.
According to this, it is understood that there is a difference between the time of the Mikdash versus the time of Galut:
In the time of the Mikdash, when Bnei Yisroel were found in a condition of freedom, then they were able to fulfill, in completeness, the obligation to show that it was as if the person, himself, went out from the servitude of Egypt, even when there was the remembrance of the servitude - in deed – through the Maror.
However, in the time when Yisroel are not in their Land and we are found in Galut, a special deed that emphasizes the servitude (the eating of the Maror) is possible to cause a weakening in the remembrance of the freedom and the proper feeling of freedom. Since, in the end, he is found in a condition of Galut and servitude. Therefore, “the remembrance of servitude is nullified”, in order not to distract him (יבלבל) from that which all the deeds of this night must be in a manner of freedom.
6. The reason of the matter why we mention Yetziat Mitzrayim in every generation, in the time of Galut, even though we are found in Galut and servitude, and as we say in the beginning of the Haggadah,
“now we are slaves” –
is because the servitude of Egypt was a unique servitude. Any condition of servitude and subjugation of Bnei Yisroel is not in the scope of slavery to Pharaoh – the subjugation of the exile of Egypt. For Bnei Yisroel remained and were made free from this subjugation, forever.
One could say that this is the difference between Maror and Charoset, for both of them are a remembrance of servitude.
Maror is because of servitude and Charoset, which is Rabbinical, is “also due to servitude”.
However, the remembrance of the servitude, with Maror, is related to plain servitude
(for all servitude contains bitterness etc.)
Whereas Charoset is “remembrance of the mortar that they toiled with in Egypt”. In other words, it depicts the unique servitude of Egypt.
According to this, one can explain the dispute of Rambam and Raavad regarding the dipping of the Matzah in Charoset, and the difference in this regarding the time of the Mikdash versus our time:
In the time of the Mikdash, since we were found in a condition of freedom, it was possible to fulfill the Mitzvah of the remembrance of the subjugation and the Geulah of Egypt completely, as it states,
“Remember that you were a slave i.e., as if you, yourself, were a slave and went out to freedom and were redeemed”.
Therefore, according to all, we dip the Matzah in Charoset. For this depicts that,
“He took us out from slavery to freedom”, (as aforementioned from the Bach).
However, in our time, where we are found in a condition of “slaves” (עבדין), and it is impossible to fulfill the obligation of,
“Remember that you were a slave . . and went out to freedom etc.”.
with the epitome of completeness. The question is whether we are able to fulfill it, at least in part. Namely, the fulfillment of, “And you shall remember” - the going out from the unique subjugation of Egypt.
(For this exists even when one is found in Galut, as aforementioned).
Rambam maintains that one can fulfill it. Therefore, one dips the Matzah in Charoset,
“to show . . that we were taken out from slavery, which is from mortar, of which Charoset is a remembrance for”.
The intent of this refers to the going out from the servitude of Egypt (that is alluded to with mortar):
According to Raavad, this cannot be divided, and there is no Geulah in parts. Therefore, although we fulfill the telling of the exodus of Egypt in all the details etc., and the Mitzvah of Matzah even in our time is Biblical, for a person must fulfill not just the telling of the exodus of Egypt but rather even the deed of freedom.
Nevertheless, it is impossible to fulfill,
“Remember that you were a slave . . and went out to freedom etc.”.
(completely) in deed when one is found in a condition of “slaves”.
(One could say, that this is the precise wording of the Raavad’s opposition, “this is folly” (הבל). For one could say that he is alluding with this that this “showing” – namely, that the dipping of the Matzah in Charoset,
“to show” that, “we were taken out from slavery, which is from mortar, of which Charoset is a remembrance for, to freedom that the Matzah is a remembrance for”,
in our time, when we are not free, is not a remembrance but rather in the scope of “folly”)
7. One could say that the explanation of all this in Pnimiyut is:
The reason that the servitude and Galut of Egypt is more severe than all the other Galut, is not just due to the physical servitude and subjugation- the literal hardship of subjugation. Rather, it is also (and on the contrary, primarily) due to the spiritual “hardship of subjugation” - where Bnei Yisroel, in Egypt, were degraded and subjugated (נכנעים ומשועבדים) to the “evil” of Egypt.
As is known the explanation of the verse,
“The Egyptians treated us badly and oppressed us”
is that the Egyptians made us evil (שהמצרים עשו אותנו רעים). This means that their evil entered into us
(so much so that Bnei Yisroel were sunken in the forty-nine gates of impurity. As the Sages state that at the time of the Splitting of the Sea (קרי״ס), the Middah of Judgement claimed, “those serve idols, and these etc.)
The reason that the spiritual Galut of Egypt was harsher than all the other Galut – is because the evil of the Galut of Egypt is more severe that the other Galut
(as the Sages state that the Egyptians were the most corrupt of all the nations, and this is alluded to in the Egyptians being called “the licentious of the earth” (ערות הארץ)).
This is not just a difference in quantity. Rather, this is an entirely different category. For the evil of Egypt contains the quintessential point (נקודה הכללי) of evil, from which all the details of evil branch out (including - all the evils of the other Galut)
This is one of the explanations in the statement of the Sages that all the kingdoms (המלכיות) are named after Egypt since they oppressed (מצירים) Yisroel. This is because the evil of Egypt is the root and source of the evil of all the other kingdoms (and Galut). For Egypt is the point of evil (נקודת הרע) from which all the details of evil branch out, as aforementioned. Therefore, all of them are called by its name.
One could say that this aspect of Galut of Egypt – which possesses the general point of evil – is alluded to in the aspect of Charoset, which is “a remembrance for the mortar”.
(and as aforementioned, that this emphasizes that it is a remembrance for the harshness of the servitude that is specifically unique to Galut of Egypt).
This is the (inner) reason that regarding Charoset, there are two laws (as aforementioned Par. 2) in the words of Rambam the Alter Rebbe):
For one could say that they correspond to the two aspects of the Galut and subjugation of Egypt:
According to this, one can explain the difference between Charoset and Maror. For regarding Maror, there is a requirement as to how much one must eat (a k'zayit/כְּזַיִת). Whereas, regarding Charoset there is no requirement for an amount of a k'zayit, there is no amount, at all.
For an “amount” depicts a thing that is comprised together (דבר המצטרף) from parts and details. And in order to attain the desired quantity, one must have a certain amount. Whereas, something that is not in the scope of an “amount” is because it is in the scope of a point (נקודה)
(This is similar to a prohibition in an item whose amount is an iota (“משהו”). For the prohibition on this is not just a particular aspect, but rather it is the point of it all (נקודת הכל)
(like the Sages state “Anyone who admits to idolatry denies the entire Torah”).
Therefore, an amount is not applicable).
The same is regarding Charoset. Since it is a remembrance for the entire quintessential evil of Egypt, therefore it has no amount.
8. One finds a second aspect in Charoset:
“it is a remembrance for the apple’
(as it states in the Talmud and it is cited as Halacha in the Alter Rebbe‘s Shulchan Aruch)
Namely, that it is a remembrance for that which, it is a remembrance for that which:
“they (the Jewish women) would give birth to their children there (beneath the apple trees) without sorrow. As it states, ‘Beneath the apple tree, I aroused you’”.
According to this explanation, the obligation of Charoset is a remembrance for a good thing – the eminence of Yisroel. This is especially so, according to what the Geonim state,
(and this is also ruled so in the Rama and in the Alter Rebbe‘s Shulchan Aruch),
that one should make Charoset with fruits that are attributed to the Jewish People (Knesset Yisroel).
According to the aforementioned (Par. 6), one can connect the two aspects, ‘it is a remembrance for the mortar” and ‘it is a remembrance for the apple”:
It is written,
“G-d has made one corresponding to the other” (גם את זה לעומת זה עשה האלקים)
From this it is understood that the opposition, from the evil of Egypt, against the good of Bnei Yisroel is similar to its example (מעין דוגמתה).
For since Egypt is quintessential general point of evil, therefore it opposes (not (just) a specific quality of Bnei Yisroel, but) the quintessential point of Judaism (לנקודת היהדות), the essence of good in the Jewish souls. This is the aspect of the Geulah from Egypt – that it is a spiritual Geulah. For the point of the good of the Jewish souls were redeemed from its Galut under the evil rulership of Egypt.
(One could say that this is also the reason that the Geulah of Egypt is an eternal Geulah. So much so, that each person is obligated to see himself as if he went out of Egypt. For through the Geulah of Egypt “the essential good” of the Jewish souls were redeemed - eternally – from the impurity of Egypt. This was in a manner that there is no other possibility that Bnei Yisroel would be under the evil subjugation of Egypt. In other words, there is no possibility for the quintessential general point of evil to subjugate the point of Judaism of Bnei Yisroel. Therefore, with regard to the essential point of the Jewish souls, since the time that they went out of Egypt, they were made “free people” (בני חורין) eternally.
(For the subjugation to the “evil” of the other exiles (since the evil of these exiles is just an extension of evil, therefore, even the subjugation) is just a spreading (in the powers) of the person - his intellect, and Middot and so forth. However, (the essence of) his soul is constantly “faithful to Him, blessed be He”).
One could say that this is the essence of what the Maharal states, that at the Geulah of Egypt, Bnei Yisroel received the essential quality of “free people” and no occurrence of Galut afterward, can nullify this, at all).
This is why the aspect of the Charoset is ‘a remembrance for the apple”. For this miracle (the birth of the children – “without sorrow”) comes due to the essential affection of G-d for Bnei Yisroel (החיבה העצמית), due to their essential being Bnei Yisroel and they possess the essential general point of Judaism.
According to this, one can explain why Charoset has no amount (also) in a positive sense. For the aspect of the Charoset, in the soul of a person, corresponds to the essential point of Judaism, the essence of the soul, which is above amount and measurement.
9. According to the aforementioned, one can explain the two aforementioned laws of the Charoset:
The Mitzvah in the essence of bringing the Charoset on the table corresponds to that which the Charoset as a relation to the essential point of Judaism – (the essence of ) the Jewish soul, whose quality is not bound and limited in actually doing good. Rather, in the essence of its being, it is good. Therefore, this is expressed in that which its very essence of being on the table is a Mitzvah.
However, the intent is not that the point of Judaism should remain independent, but rather, that it should spread and influence all the powers of the person, that they should be imbued with the point and source of the good that is due to the (essence of the) soul. This is alluded to in the second law of Charoset – the obligation to dip the Matzah in it. In other words, that even in the Matzah (that depicts the revealed good of the person) the aspect of Charoset should be felt in it.
According to this, one can understand the difference between the time of the Mikdash and the time of Galut regarding the dipping of the Matzah in Charoset. For there is a major difference in the need of the effect of the “Charoset” between the time of the Mikdash versus the time of Galut
In the time of the Mikdash, Bnei Yisroel were found in a condition of physical freedom. This also depicts spiritual freedom and Geulah – that the Shechinah rests among Yidden and that the spiritual condition of Yidden is as it should be. Their Avodat HaShem is proper and all the powers of their soul are in a condition of freedom from the Yetzer Hara – and they are all subjugated to G-d and to his service, blessed be He.
However, since a person’s powers are limited and measured, a person must reveal and draw down the epitome of his soul, which is above “measure”) (from form (מציור), from measure and boundary).
Through this, all of his powers become imbued with the power of Mesirat Nefesh that is due (to the essence) of the soul. This is the essence of the aspect of the dipping the Matzah in Charoset, in the time of the Temple - that it brings one to a condition of complete freedom.
However, in the time of Galut, when the G-dly soul is in Galut and imprisonment under the rulership of the Yetzer Hara and the Animal Soul. Whether it be in his character and intellect – and certainly when they have rulership over the garments of the person - in his thought, speech and deed - that they are not proper. In this, one comes to the dispute of the Rambam and the Raavad - whether the aspect of dipping the Matzah in Charoset is applicable:
According to the view of the Rambam, even then, one must dip the Matzah in Charoset. In other words, one must awaken the point and essence of the soul so that it be illuminated with its powers. Through this, one can subdue and overturn them, that they go out of the Galut and imprisonment of the body and Animal soul.
However, the Raavad disputes this and writes, “this is folly”:
For since this freedom comes solely due to the essence of his soul, that
“even while the sin is being committed, he remains faithful to Him”.
Yet, his powers, as they are, in and of themselves, are in the confinement and imprisonment of the Yetzer Hara, this is not a real (ממשית) influence on his powers, but rather it is just in a manner of “folly”, that will not endure.
10. This debate and question is solely in the condition of Yidden in prior times.
However, in the heels of Moshiach (בעקבתא דמשיחא), after all the evil decrees and assimilations, G-d forbid, may they never happen again; and after the tremendous increase in Torah and Mitzvot, that merits Yidden – and it is certain and plain that Bnei Yisroel has refined themselves, with refining after refining, and that each person of Bnei Yisroel is fitting to be a “free person” in essence, and also in the revealed powers, and also in one’s thought, speech and deed – so much so, that he becomes a literal “free person”, in actual deed.
May it be His will, that truly in this Nisan, that the promise of the Sages,
“In Nisan they will be redeemed”
be fulfilled and that it be in a condition of literal “free people”, as it states,
“we shall thank You with a new song (שיר חדש) (in the male gender/לשון זכר) for our redemption and for the deliverance of our souls”.
M’Sichas Acharon shel Pesach and Shabbat Parshat Acharei 5746
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