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Synopsis:
In the Torah portion of Mishpatim, we learn1 about the four kinds of custodians: the shomer chinom (who watches an object without fee), the shomer sachar (who guards an object for a fee), the socher (who rents an object), and the sho’el (who borrows an object).
Although these are four distinct categories, the Gemara2 explains that according to R. Meir “There are ‘four custodians’ whose ‘ordinances are three.’ ” This is so, says R. Meir,3 because the socher and shomer sachar share the same laws with regard to damages and to loss of an object placed in their trust.
Rashi4 explains R. Meir’s reasoning as follows: “Since it is in his possession for his own personal pleasure, although the renter is paying for its use, he is considered a shomer sachar. For if he were not paying for it he would be considered a sho’el ….”
Rashi thus implies that were it not for his payment for the use of the object, the socher would indeed have the same liability as a sho’el. This is because the socher — unlike the shomer sachar (who is essentially guarding the object), is similar to the sho’el in that both take temporary possession of an object for their personal benefit.
With regard to their relation to the object itself, as well as to its owner, the four kinds of custodians are divided along these lines: All the benefits accrue to the owner of the object when it is guarded by the shomer chinom , since the latter is not remunerated in any way. The sho’el is at the opposite end of the spectrum, inasmuch as all the pleasure is derived by the borrower and none by the lender. Then there is the shomer sachar and the socher, who are similar in that both they as well as the owner benefit from the arrangement.
The above outline helps us understand the phrase that “There are ‘four custodians’ whose ‘ordinance are three,’ ” in terms of man’s spiritual service. For the Shaloh states:5 “Just as four kinds of custodians exist in terms of interpersonal relationships, so too they exist in terms of the relationship between man and G‑d.”
This is as follows.6 The world’s existence is dependent on the performance of Torah and mitzvos by the Jewish people.7 The Jews are thus the “custodians” of the world, G‑d having given it over to us to “guard” for Him.
The spiritual significance of these four types of custodian will be understood accordingly: a shomer chinom is involved in the loftiest level of spiritual service, for he serves G‑d without seeking remuneration. The shomer sachar, on the other hand, serves only for the sake of a reward, while the socher is similar to an individual who says: “This money shall go to charity on the condition that my sick child lives.”8
Then there is the sho’el , the Jew who demands all manner of benefit as his birthright, without the need to serve. However, just as one who borrows an object is responsible for accidents, so does the spiritual sho’el obligate himself to perform Torah and mitzvos by his very reliance on G‑d’s bounty; he cannot excuse himself because of an “accident.”
The sho’el’ s performance of Torah and mitzvos is thus not a true service, which involves an obligation to serve for the sake of his Master. Rather, he does so strictly for the benefit he seeks to derive.
The difference between the spiritual service of the shomer sachar and the socher will be better understood in light of the explanation provided earlier: The shomer sachar is mainly employed as a guard for the benefit of the owner of the object, while the socher desires to use the object for his own needs.
The same is true of their spiritual service. The principal motivation of the shomer sachar is a desire to serve G‑d, but he has yet to attain the wholly unselfish kind of service that characterizes the shomer chinom , and so he expects remuneration.
The socher , however, is quite different. He desires to benefit from the world and receive his needs, but is also sensitive enough to realize that he must “repay” G‑d (the Master of the world) through the spiritual service of Torah and mitzvos.
Although their service is thus dissimilar, in the end, the law of the socher is similar to that governing the shomer sachar. For since after all is said and done the socher is serving G‑d in a manner similar to that of the shomer sachar , he too comes under the same heading of one who is actively engaged in spiritual service.
Based on Likkutei Sichos , Vol. XXXI, pp. 112-118.
From: https://www.sie.org/templates/sie/article_cdo/aid/4313443/jewish/Mishpatim-Four-Custodians.htm
FOOTNOTES
1.Shmos 22:6-14; Bava Metzia 93a, Shavuos 49a. See also Rambam, beginning of Hilchos Sechirus ; commentary of Rashi on Shmos 22:14.
2.Bava Metzia 93a, Shavuos 49b.
3.Bava Metzia 80b.
4.Ibid.
5.Mesichta Pesachim 155a.
6.See Shaloh ibid. ; Shach Al HaTorah ; Rosh David (from the Chidah) Torah portion Mishpatim.
7.See Shabbos 88a, and additional sources cited there. See also Zohar, Vol. II, p. 161a-b.
8.Bava Basra 10b.
Translation:
Note: The following is from the full side-by side translation at
https://www.chabad.org/therebbe/article_cdo/aid/5249888/jewish/Mishpatim-A-Talmudic-Intricacy-And-Its-Spiritual-Counterpart.htm
1. The Mishnah states: 9
There are four categories of watchmen:10 an unpaid watchman, a borrower, a paid watchman, and a renter:
An unpaid watchman may absolve himself of liability by taking an oath in all instances of loss.
A borrower must reimburse the owner in all instances of loss.
A paid watchman and a renter may both absolve themselves of liability by taking an oath if the entrusted object or animal is broken or injured, captured, or dies, but they must reimburse the owner if it is lost or stolen.
The Gemara discusses that teaching:11
Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen? Rav Nachman says… “It is Rabbi Meir.”
Rava said to Rav Nachman: “Is there any Sage who does not accept the premise that there are four categories of watchmen?”, (i.e., we are forced to say that we find four categories of watchmen, Rashi).12
Rav Nachman responded to him: “This is what I am saying to you: Who is the Sage who maintains that the laws pertaining to a renter are the same as those pertaining to a paid watchman? It is Rabbi Meir.” (He maintains that a renter must pay whenever a paid watchman is required to.)
[The Gemara questions], “If so,13 [why does the mishnah mention] four categories?” There are only three.
Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak14 responded, “There are four categories of watchmen, who are governed by three sets of laws.”15
Clarification is necessary: The simple meaning of Rav Nachman’s words, “This is what I am saying to you…,” implies that by saying, “Who is the Sage who maintains that the laws pertaining to a renter resemble those pertaining to a paid watchman? It is Rabbi Meir,” Rav Nachman did not retract his original statement, “Who16 is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?...” Instead, he was explaining the intent of the rhetorical question he originally asked.
“This is what I am saying to you…” means to say that the question, “Who is the Sage who maintains that the laws pertaining to a renter resemble those pertaining to a paid watchman?” is not a new and different query, but an explanation of his original question, “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” That question is answered, as it was originally, “It is Rabbi Meir.”
On the surface, clarification is needed regarding the above explanation of these two questions. [From the assertion in the explanation of his question given by Rav Nachman: “the laws pertaining to a renter resemble those pertaining to a paid watchman,” i.e., there isn’t a separate category of laws governing a renter, it appears that there are three categories of watchmen. In his first question, however, Rav Nachman asked, “Who isthe Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?”17
The apparent contradiction between Rav Nachman’s explanation of his question and the question itself is evident from the fact that the Gemara asks immediately after Rav Nachman’s explanation, “If so, [why does the mishnah mention] four categories? There are only three.”18
Delineating a Renter’s Obligation
2. It is possible to offer the following explanation: Rashi19 clarifies the reason for the difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah regarding whether a renter is governed by the laws pertaining to an unpaid watchman or a paid watchman. He states that the reasoning of Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a renter is judged like an unpaid watchman, is based on the logic that “he pays a fee for working with the object and he does not receive any payment for taking care of the object.” The intent is that, although a renter benefits from the use of the object, that benefit is not viewed as a wage that causes him to be considered a paid watchman. The benefit he receives does not come as payment for taking care of the object; rather, “he pays a fee for working with it.” Hence, since “he does not receive payment for taking care of the object,” Rabbi Yehudah considers him as an unpaid watchman.
The reasoning of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a renter is considered a paid watchman, is based on the logic that:11
Since the entrusted object is in his possession for his benefit, even though he pays a fee for working with it, he is considered as a paid watchman. Were he not to pay a fee, he would be considered as a borrower and would be liable even if the entrusted object was destroyed due to circumstances beyond his control. Since he does pay a fee, he is not considered a borrower, but a paid watchman.
Rashi’s wording implies that, according to Rabbi Meir, fundamentally, a renter should be governed by the laws pertaining to a borrower. Nevertheless, since “he does pay a fee, he is not considered a borrower, but as a paid watchman.”
The intent is that Rabbi Meir does not consider the renter’s obligation to take care of the entrusted object as a further payment in addition to the fee he pays for benefitting from the object. Were that to be true, the benefit from the object would be considered as payment for taking care of it and he would therefore be considered a paid watchman for that reason.20 Instead, the entire reason for the renter’s liability is that the entrusted object is in his possession for his benefit. In this, he resembles a borrower.21 Nevertheless, since “he does pay a fee, he is not” actually “considered a borrower, but” merely “a paid watchman.”
To explain the issue: There is a fundamental difference between the basis for obligations of both an unpaid and a paid watchman and those of a borrower. A watchman is one who, as indicated by the meaning of the term, accepts responsibility and obligates himself to take care of another person’s object until he returns it to that person intact.22
[The obligations of an unpaid watchman and a paid watchman are not the same. Since a paid watchman receives payment for taking care of the entrusted object, he is obligated to guard it more scrupulously,23 guarding not only against negligence, but also against the object being stolen and him losing it. By contrast, since an unpaid watchman does not receive payment for taking care of the entrusted object, it is sufficient that he guard it less diligently. Hence, he is not liable for theft and loss. However, they share this common factor: Their obligation stems from the commitment they made.]
In comparison, a borrower’s obligation does not stem only from his commitment to watch24 the object belonging to the lender. Instead, it is as if he acquired the object25 entirely and is obligated to return it; it is like a loan. Since the benefit is entirely his,26 he acquires the object17 in that he becomes liable even if it is destroyed due to circumstances beyond his control (even though a person cannot guard against such situations, and they are not included in the obligations of a watchman.)27
This is Rashi’s intent in explaining Rabbi Meir’s opinion that the obligations of a renter are the same as those of a paid watchman, “since the entrusted object is in his possession for his benefit.” According to this approach, the basis for the renter’s obligation is not that he accepted an obligation to guard the object, but rather that the entrusted object is in his possession, and it is there, not for the sake of him guarding the object on behalf of its owner, but for his own sake, so that he can use and benefit from it. In this, he resembles a borrower. Nevertheless, “since the renter does pay a fee, he is not considered a borrower, but a paid watchman.” The fact that the benefit is not entirely his – for he pays for the benefit he receives – reduces and lessens his obligation from that of a borrower. Hence, “he is not considered a borrower, but a paid watchman.” Paying the fee lessens the obligations that the renter would inherently have, were he a borrower, removing his liability for loss due to circumstances beyond his control. Hence, he remains liable only for theft or loss, like a paid watchman.28
Thus, a renter is an intermediate category between a paid watchman and a borrower. Regarding the fundamental definition and nature of his obligation, he is a borrower, since the object is in his possession for his benefit. Nevertheless, regarding the extent of his obligation and the laws that apply to him, he is a paid watchman because the owner of the object receives benefit from the renter’s having the object in his possession.
How are the Categories of Watchmen Defined?
3. On this basis, the questions regarding the Talmudic passage mentioned in sec. 1 can be fully understood. The question – “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” – stems from the fact that the mishnah mentions a specific number of watchmen, stating: “There are four categories of watchmen.” Whenever a number is specified in a mishnah, there is an inference to be derived from that fact. Hence, when discussing such mishnayos, the Talmud frequently asks:29 “Why is the number mentioned?” Accordingly, Rav Nachman concludes that the division into four categories of watchmen is not merely an external matter – that in practice there are four ways an entrusted object can be found in the possession of a watchman (as Rashi states,30 “one is an unpaid watchman, another a paid watchman, the third a borrower, and the fourth, a renter”). Instead, the four categories are also of a fundamentally distinct nature.
This is the intent of Rav Nachman’s question, “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” and of his answer, “It is Rabbi Meir.” Only according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a renter’s liability is that of a paid watchman, can it be said that there are four fundamentally distinct categories of watchmen.
According to Rabbi Yehudah, who maintains that a renter’s liability is that of an unpaid watchman, it is true that, in actual fact, a renter who pays a fee does not resemble an unpaid watchman, as mentioned above. Nevertheless, with regard to the obligation to care for the entrusted object incumbent on the renter as a watchman, the renter is exactly the same as an unpaid watchman, because he does not receive a fee for taking care of the object. Therefore, there are only three types of categories of watchmen, not four.
By contrast, according to Rabbi Meir who maintains that a renter’s liability is that of a paid watchman, the intent is not that the definition of, and rationale for, the renter’s liability is the same as that of a paid watchman. Instead, it is only that, in actual practice, he is governed by the laws applying to a paid watchman, i.e., it is only the extent of his liability that resembles that of a paid watchman. However, the nature of his obligation resembles that of a borrower. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider him as a distinct type of watchman. As such, the mishnah states that there are not three, but four categories of watchmen.
This is the intent of Rabbi Nachman’s response when Rava asked him, “Is there any Sage who does not accept that there are four categories of watchmen?” Rava’s conception was that the division into four categories of watchmen referred to the actual ways in which a person becomes a watchman, and hence he states, “We find [the mishnah explicitly mentioning] that there are four categories of watchmen.”
Rav Nachman responded to him: “This is what I am saying to you,” my intent – in asking “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” and answering, “It is Rabbi Meir” – is to point out that the emphasis of the mishnah, “There are four categories of watchmen,” (i.e., that fundamentally, the statement that there are four intrinsically distinct categories of watchmen) applies only according to the understanding of Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a renter is governed by the laws governing a paid watchman, as explained above.
This is also the intent of the Gemara’s give-and-take at the conclusion of the passage:
If so, [why does the mishnah mention] four categories? There are only three.
There are four categories of watchmen, who are governed by three sets of laws.
According to the approach of the Sage who questions Rav Nachman’s reasoning, there is an implied contradiction. If a renter and a paid watchman differ not only in the actual way in which they incur the responsibilities of a watchman, but also in the fundamental definition of their obligation, how is it that they share the same liability? Since there is no difference in the extent of their liability, we are forced to say that there are – fundamentally, not only regarding their obligations – only three 31 intrinsically distinct categories32 of watchmen.
To this, the Talmud answers, “There are four categories of watchmen, who are governed by three sets of laws.” The fundamental characteristics of a paid watchman and a renter are different. Thus, there are four distinct categories of watchmen, each one with fundamentally unique characteristics. Nevertheless, as explained above, they are divided into three groups with regard to the laws governing their liability.
A Spiritual Counterpart
4. The above explanation – that “There are four categories of watchmen, who are governed by three sets of laws” – is based on the understanding that a paid watchman and a renter differ in the fundamental nature of the obligation that they undertook to care for the owner’s object. Therefore, “There are four categories of watchmen.” However, regarding the laws governing liability, a renter is liable to the same extent as a paid watchman. Therefore, “they are governed by three sets of laws.”
It is possible to say that the above explanation relates to the spiritual counterpart of the four categories of watchmen in our Divine service.33 As Shelah states,34 “Just as there exist four categories of watchmen in relationships between man and man, so too, there exist four similar categories in the relationship between man and the Omnipresent, blessed be He.”
To explain this concept:35
As is well known,36 the existence of the world is dependent on the Jews’ observance of the Torah and its mitzvos. Thus, the Jews are “watchmen,” as it were, in whose care G‑d entrusted His world.37 This parallels the charge G‑d gave Adam, the first man, whom He placed in the Garden of Eden and commanded to “till it and care for it.”38Similarly, the Jews are to care for the world through their observance of the Torah and its mitzvos.
According to a straightforward understanding, the four categories of watchmen are divided into three general groupings with regard to the way a watchman relates to the entrusted object and its owner:
a) In the instance of an unpaid watchman, all the benefit for his caring for the entrusted object is the owner’s. The watchman does not benefit from caring for the object at all, for he does not profit from doing so. He acts solely for the benefit of the owner.
b) A borrower derives the entire benefit from the object. The owner does not receive any benefit from it while it is in the domain of the borrower.
c) A paid watchman and a renter are linked in one group because they share a common denominator: In each of these instances, both the owner and the watchman derive benefit.39 In the instance of a paid watchman, the owner benefits from having his object guarded in a superior manner and the watchman benefits from the fee he receives for his effort. With regard to a renter, he benefits from the use of the owner’s object and the owner benefits from the rental fee he receives in return.
According to this, it is possible to explain the definition of the four categories of watchmen in “the relationship between man and the Omnipresent, blessed be He,” as Shelah, loc. cit., states:40
“An unpaid watchman represents the loftiest category, one who acts without the intent to receive a reward at all; he watches for G‑d’s sake alone.”
To elaborate, using the wording of Rambam:41
He serves G‑d out of love… for no ulterior motive… nor in order to acquire benefit – not even to receive a share in the World to Come.42 “Rather, he does what is true because it is true,” serving G‑d, “because He is the Master and it is fitting to serve Him.”43
“A paid watchman serves in order to receive a reward.”44 Similarly, a renter45 “is like one who says, ‘I am giving this sela46 to tzedekah so that my son will live,’ ”47i.e., he also seeks to derive personal benefit from his service. See sec. 6, below.
“A borrower; ‘all the benefit is his’…. He does not believe [that G‑d metes out] reward and punishment.”36 As Shelah explains,48 this category refers to the wicked who are not at all involved in Divine service.
Looking at a Borrower Generously
5. Perhaps it is possible to explain Shelah’s words and also interpret the concept of a borrower49 in a more favorable light so that the interpretation can also refer to one who observes the Torah and its mitzvos. (This appears to be appropriate since, in a simple sense, all the subjects in the four categories mentioned above are referred as “watchmen,”50 who guard the world, as explained above, through their observance of the Torah and its mitzvos.)51
As an introduction: The entire world was created for the sake of the Jewish people, as Rashi52 states in the beginning of his commentary on the Torah: the world was created “for the sake of Israel who are called, ‘the first.’ ” Accordingly, every Jew can rightfully claim and demand53 all of his material needs – an abundance of children, life and health, and sustenance – even without performing any activity or service on his part, just because he is a descendant of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov. This is reflected in the opinion mentioned in the mishnah,54 that when an employer promises to provide his workers with food, he does not fulfill his obligation to them “even if… he provides them with a meal like the feasts of King Shlomoh at the height of his prosperity,” because they are “the descendants of Avraham, Yitzchak, and Yaakov.” As a descendant of the Patriarchs, every Jew is worthy of a feast of even greater magnitude.55
(The logic of the Sage in the mishnah who offers a different view, maintaining that the employer is only required to provide for a worker according to the common local custom,46 is not that he doesn’t consider every Jew worthy of the above. It is only that he maintains that the employer, when promising to provide his workers with food, merely intended to provide them with the meals ordinarily given to workers in his region. Hence, legally, the employer cannot be obligated to provide them with more.
This is the spiritual counterpart of a borrower – one who derives the entire benefit himself. He benefits from the world, receiving everything he needs, without any payment, i.e., Divine service, on his part.
Now, a borrower of an object acquires it, as it were.17 Since it is he who derives all the benefit from the object, he is liable if it is destroyed due to circumstances beyond his control. Similarly, on the spiritual plane, when a person desires to benefit from the world without Divine service, the very benefit he receives obligates him to return, i.e., to pay for his portion of the world to G‑d in its totality. He fulfills that obligation by observing the Torah and its mitzvos because the world’s existence is dependent on their observance, as explained above. He cannot claim that he is exempt due to circumstances beyond his control, even if those circumstances are extremely challenging.56
Thus, the “borrower” does not observe the Torah and its mitzvos as an act of service: i.e., the service of G‑d implies a responsibility, submitting oneself to perform service for the sake of a Master, G‑d. Instead, the “borrower’s” observance is an obligation that results from his benefitting from the world.57 This resembles the liability of a borrower in a simple sense, in which instance – since he derives the entire benefit from his use of the object – it is as if he acquired it. As a result, he is liable even in circumstances beyond his control. In such an instance, his obligation to make restitution is an obligation owed to himself, as it were.
In the spiritual parallel, such a person desires to benefit from the world; that is his goal. Since that benefit requires observance, he fulfills the mitzvos. However, he does not do so in order to serve G‑d, but to receive the benefits that accrue from his service. Thus, he is serving himself, as it were.58
Acting for G‑d or Acting for One’s Own Sake
6. We can now appreciate how the spiritual counterpart of these laws corresponds to the explanation of the four categories of watchmen mentioned at the outset. Based on the above explanation of Rabbi Meir’s understanding of the difference between a renter and a paid watchman, it is possible to elaborate further on Shelah’s explanation of the spiritual counterpart of these categories. Shelah states that a paid watchman is one who serves G‑d in order to receive a reward and a renter is comparable to a person who says, “I am giving this sela to tzedekah so that my son will live.” It is not only that they approach the reward and the benefit they receive for their Divine service differently; they represent two distinct categories.
To explain: As clarified at length above, conceptually, a renter and a paid watchman are two fundamentally distinct categories. A paid watchman is – as the name implies – first and foremost a watchman. He obligated and indebted59 himself to take care of the object belonging to the owner and receives his wage accordingly. By contrast, the fundamental goal of the renter is entirely different. He desires that the object enter into his domain for his benefit and he pays a rental fee to attain that goal.
Similar concepts apply with regard to the spiritual counterpart of these concepts. The fundamental purpose of the paid watchman is the service of G‑d. He desires to carry out G‑d’s will and take care of the world for His sake. Nevertheless, he has not reached the level of an unpaid watchman, who serves without the intent of receiving a reward. The paid watchman cannot say that a reward is not important to him. On the contrary, he looks forward to receiving a reward for his Divine service.
By contrast, a renter has a fundamentally different approach. He wants and desires to benefit from the world, to receive all his needs. However, he knows and feels that he is obligated to pay G‑d, the Owner of the world, for the benefit he receives. He therefore observes the Torah and its mitzvos.
For this reason, Shelah cites the example of one who says, “I am giving this sela to tzedekah so that my son will live.” This example emphasizes that the fundamental reason he is giving the tzedekah is that he needs salvation from G‑d – he wants his son to live.60
Thus, the spiritual counterpart of a renter is intrinsically distinct from the spiritual counterpart of both a borrower and a paid watchman. He is not like a borrower, since he views his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos as payment due G‑d for the benefit he receives from the world. Thus, his observance of the Torah can be considered serving G‑d, i.e., Divine service performed for G‑d’s sake and not for his own. (In contrast, a borrower demands that his needs be fulfilled without cost and his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos is not considered as “the service of G‑d,” as explained in sec. 5, above.)
Nevertheless, neither can a renter61 be considered as a paid watchman. The difference is that the Divine service of a paid watchman in his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos is for G‑d’s sake. (In a halachic context, the benefit a paid watchman receives for serving as a watchman does not come from the actual physical object entrusted to him. The wage he receives is a tangential dimension of the arrangement between him and the owner.)62 By contrast, from the very outset, a renter sees his observance of the Torah and its mitzvos as payment to G‑d for the benefit he receives from the world. He is not acting as watchman, as one who cares for G‑d’s world.
Seeing Every Jew as G‑d’s Servant
7. Nevertheless, although the fundamental definition of a renter is different than that of a paid watchman, they are judged by the same laws. As such, the four categories of watchmen “are governed by only three sets of laws.”
Since, ultimately, “the renter” acts in the service of G‑d, he is therefore judged as belonging in the category of “servants of G‑d,” just as a paid watchman, serving Him, albeit not for His sake.63
We have been adjured,64 “A person should always engage in the Torah and its mitzvos even though it is not for G‑d’s sake, for through involvement that is not for G‑d’s sake, he will arrive at involvement for G‑d’s sake.”
Thus, ultimately, everyone – even a borrower, one engaged in the lowest level of service that is not for G‑d’s sake – will perform Divine service out of love, without any concern for his own self, to the extent that, to quote Rambam, “His soul is bound up in the love of G‑d. Thus, he will always be obsessed with this love…. He will abandon everything in the world except for this.”65 And, as Rambam assured in that same text, “Eventually, good will come because of it,”66i.e., ultimately, G‑d will also grant him benefits in this material world..
Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 31, p. 112ff. Adapted from a sichah delivered on Shabbos Parshas Vayishlach, 5747 1986
FOOTNOTES
1. Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 35, p. 288.
2. See Zohar, Vol. III, p. 152a, as explained in the maamar entitled Gal Einai, 5737 (Toras Menachem, Sefer HaMaamarim Melukat, Vol. 3, p. 291ff.).
3. Bava Metzia 93a; Shevuos 49a.
4. Shmos 22:6–13.
5. Bava Metzia 81a. A similar exemption applies to an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman, and a borrower.
6. Shmos 22:14.
7. Shelah, Tractate Pesachim, p. 155a.
8. Pesachim 50b; Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah 3:5.
9. Bava Metzia 93a; Shevuos 49a.
10. Rambam, Hilchos Sechirus 1:1 states, “The Torah mentions four categories of watchmen.” The Scriptural source that mentions an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman, and a borrower is Shmos 22:6–13. A renter is also mentioned in the Torah (ibid. 22:14). However, as Rashi explains in his commentary to the above verse, the laws that apply to him are not explicitly stated.
11. Bava Metzia, loc. cit.; Shevuos 49b.
12. Bava Metzia, loc. cit. In Shevuos, loc. cit., Rashi, s.v. Rabbi Meir, states, “We are forced to say that there are four categories of watchmen: one who is unpaid, one who is paid, one who is a borrower, and one who is a renter.”
13. In Shevuos, loc. cit., the text reads, “Are there four? There are actually three,” instead of “If so, [why does the Mishnah mention] four categories?” There, Rashi states “The text does not read ‘If so’ ” – as it does in Bava Metzia – because “the question is being asked both according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Yehudah.” However, in Bava Metzia, Rashi does not amend the text. See Tosafos, Bava Metzia, loc. cit., s.v. ee hachi; Toras Chayim, Shevuos, loc. cit., and other commentaries to Bava Metzia, loc. cit. See also footnote 24, below.
14. It is unclear whether Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak is the same Sage as Rav Nachman mentioned above. See Tosafos, Gittin 31b, which maintains that whenever the Gemara mentions Rav Nachman without further elaboration, the intent is Rav Nachman bar Yaakov. Thus, this passage would be speaking about two different Sages. However, Tosafos mentions that according to Rashi when the Gemara mentions Rav Nachman without further elaboration, the intent is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak. Were that to be the understanding here, initially, the Gemara only referred to Rav Nachman by his first name and here, his father’s name is also mentioned.
15. Rambam, Hilchos Sechirus 1:1, 2 and 2:1, makes a similar statement.
16. Although at first glance, one might think that Rav Nachman was responding to a question posed by another Sage, his later statement, “This is what I am saying to you…,” indicates that Rav Nachman himself was the one who asked, “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” It was a rhetorical question that he answered (Ein Yehosef, Bava Metzia, loc. cit.).
17. Kos Yeshu’os, Bava Metzia, loc. cit., explains that the meaning of the question, “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” is, “Who is the Sage who authored the mishnah, ‘There are four categories of watchmen?’ ” – which teaches that the laws of a paid watchman and a renter are the same. However, this explanation is somewhat problematic because the wording, “Who is the Sage who taught that there are four categories of watchmen?” implies that the question concerns the number of categories of watchmen (as Rava) understood. This is particularly true since, were the intent to have been, “Who authored the mishnah, ‘There are four categories of watchmen’?”, shorter wording should have been used, as in numerous instances where the Gemara asks merely, “Who authored this mishnah?” or the like, without quoting its opening words.
18. The wording the Gemara uses also requires some clarification. After initially questioning, “Is there any Sage who does not accept that there are four categories of watchmen?”, which means, as Rashi comments, “We are forced to say that we find four categories of watchmen,” how is it appropriate to continue and say, “There are only three,” because there are only three sets of laws?
19. Bava Metzia 80b; s.v. Rabbi Yehudah, and s.v. Rabbi Meir.
20. This appears to be the approach of the Talmud Yerushalmi, Shevuos 8:1, which states, “Since a paid watchman and a renter benefit to a certain extent and give the owner benefit to a certain extent, they absolve themselves of liability through an oath in some instances and make restitution in other instances.”
21. On this basis, the reason why the Torah mentions a renter in the same passage concerning a borrower (Shmos 26:14)becomes clear. It is not merely that their actions are similar, i.e., they both use the object for their own purposes. Instead, the reason the Torah links them is that the article entered his possession for his benefit. Note Levush, Choshen Mishpat, 291:1, which also focuses on the fact that the Torah mentions the relationship between a renter and a borrower.
22. See the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 443:8, and consult the Kuntreis Acharon there (note 2). The wording the Alter Rebbe uses in these sources serves as the source for the statements in the main text. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.
23. See Bava Kama 45a; Bava Metzia 93b; et al.; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, sec. 303. See however the Alter Rebbe’s Kuntreis Acharon cited above. This is not the place for further discussion of the matter.
24. See Rashi, Bava Kama 112a, s.v. ein; Machaneh Efrayim, Hilchos Shaaleh UFikadon, sec. 1. The Acharonim have elaborated regarding this matter.
25. See Kiddushin 47b; Bava Metzia 99a; Sanhedrin 72a and Rashi’s comments, s.v. aval to that source, et al. Of course, he is required to return the article to its owner after borrowing it. However, as long as it is in his possession, it his responsibility as if he were the owner.
26. Bava Metzia 34a, 94b, consult the latter source; Talmud Yerushalmi, Shevuos, loc. cit. See Rashi, Shmos 22:14; et al.
27. See Tzemach Tzedek, Chiddushim al HaShas, Kesubos, the beginning of ch. 5, s.v. ela shemishabeid gufo.
28. Note also the wording Rashi uses in Bava Metzia 81a, s.v. hashialini va’eshail lach, when speaking about a person who tells another, “lend me an object of yours, and I will lend you [an object of mine”:]“He is not a borrower to be obligated in situations beyond his control. Although he borrows the object, the entire benefit is not his.”
29. See Kerisos 2b, and the sources mentioned there.
30. Shevuos, loc. cit.
31. On this basis, we can appreciate the emphasis in the question, “If so, [why does the Mishnah mention] four categories?” On the surface, it seems that the question applies only according to the conclusion, “It is Rabbi Meir” (see footnote 5 and the sources mentioned there), for according to Rabbi Yehudah – who maintains that a renter is equivalent to an unpaid watchman – from the outset, there was never a conception that fundamentally there are four intrinsically distinct categories of watchmen (see also Mayonei HaChochmah, Bava Metzia, loc. cit.)
Toras Chayim, Shevuos, loc. cit., takes an opposite tack, explaining that, according to Rabbi Yehudah, it is obvious that there are four categories of watchmen. The rationale is that a renter and an unpaid watchman “are considered two categories, because the renter derives benefit from having the object in his possession and also provides benefit to the owner, and the unpaid watchman does not benefit at all.” By contrast, according to Rabbi Meir, the renter and the paid watchman “are considered in the same category because both benefit to a certain degree and provide benefit to the owner to a certain degree.”
Nevertheless, according to the explanations given in sec. 2, based on Rashi’s interpretation of the passage in Bava Metzia, the reason why a renter is considered an unpaid watchman is as explained in the main text.
32. It is possible to explain that the reasoning of the Sage who raises the question, “If so, [why does the Mishnah mention] four categories? There are only three,” is that he maintains that a renter is considered a paid watchman because benefiting from the object is considered like payment for renting it. This resembles the logic mentioned in sec. 2, and footnote 12. See Toras Chayim, Shevuos, as cited in the following footnote.
33.The concept of seeking a spiritual counterpart for the mitzvos is reflected in the words of Rambam, who writes (the conclusion of Hilchos Temurah), “The majority of the Torah’s laws are nothing other than ‘counsels given from afar’ from ‘He Who is of great counsel’ to improve one’s character and make one’s conduct upright.” From this statement, it is understood that, in addition to its straightforward meaning, every one of the Torah’s laws has a counterpart in man’s Divine service to His Creator, as explained in many sources.
34. Shelah, Tractate Pesachim, p. 155a, the section titled Matzah Ashirah.
35.The explanations to follow are based on Shelah, loc. cit., p. 155a-b. Other explanations regarding the spiritual counterpart of the four watchmen can be found in Shelah, Torah Shebichsav, Mishpatim, p. 320a ff., which cites Asarah Maamaros, maamar Chikur Din, part 1, ch. 3; Sifsei Kohen al HaTorah and Rosh David (authored by Chidah), Parshas Mishpatim, et al.
36. See Shabbos 88a and the sources mentioned there. See also Zohar, Vol. II, p. 161a-b, et al.
37. It is also understood that the concept of four categories of watchmen applies not only to caring for the world (as stated in the main text), but also to caring for the Torah and its mitzvos themselves and to caring for the soul. Thus, our Sages commented (Devarim Rabbah 4:4; Midrash Tehillim 17:8), “Regarding the soul and the Torah…, the Holy One, blessed be He, tells man: “My candle is entrusted to your hand…. If you take care of My candle.” See also the sources cited in footnote 27.
The explanations in the main text are based on Shelah, Tractate Pesachim, loc. cit., where a borrower who receives “all the benefit for himself” is interpreted as referring to a person who seeks to “benefit from this world,” following the pattern described in Yeshayahu 22:13, “slaying cattle and slaughtering sheep,” eating meat and drinking wine and saying, “Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we will die.”
38. Bereishis 2:15; quoted in Shelah, Tractate Pesachim, p. 155a.
39. The statements in the main text are reflected in the wording of Talmud Yerushalmi, Shevuos, loc. cit., “A paid watchman and a renter… benefit to a certain extent and provide the owner with benefit to a certain extent.” See also Moreh Nevuchim, Vol. 3, ch. 42, “Both… share in the benefit.” Rabbeinu Bachya (Shmos 22:6) makes similar statements. (See Rav Kapach’s translation of Moreh Nevuchim, “They are partners in the benefit.”)
40. Shelah, Tractate Pesachim, loc. cit. See that source and also the sources cited in footnote 27 that explain more particulars regarding spiritual counterparts of the laws of watchmen.
41. Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 10:2. In that source, Rambam states, “This is the level of Avraham, our Patriarch.” See Shelah, loc. cit., which states that Avraham “was an unpaid watchman, as reflected in the verse, ‘He kept My watch,’ i.e., ‘My watch,’ and not ‘his watch.’ He served only for G‑d’s sake, not for his own sake.”
42. Rambam, loc. cit., 10:1.
43. Ibid. 10:4.
44. Shelah, loc. cit.
45. The standard printed texts of Shelah, loc. cit., use the wording noseh s’char,*which is usually interpreted as referring to a paid watchman. However, it appears necessary to say that the intent is a renter because that text already explained the spiritual counterpart of a paid watchman. Similarly, Shelahcontinues to discuss a noseh s’char and sites the difference of opinion between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah whether a renter is judged as an unpaid watchman or a paid watchman, making it clear that he is referring to the spiritual counterpart of a renter. The understanding that Shelah is referring to a renter is further reflected in the explicit wording he uses before that, “There are four categories of watchmen: an unpaid watchman, a paid watchman, a noseh s’char, and a borrower.” There, he refers to the renter as a noseh s’char.
* This is the wording of all the editions of Shelah in our possession, the Amsterdam printings of 5409 and 5458, the Frankfort printing of 5477, the Fürth printing of 5522, the Josefsdorf printing of 5639, and the Warsaw printing of 5622. The wording in other printings should be investigated.
46. A coin of the Talmudic era.
47. Bava Basra 10b, and the sources cited there.
48. Shelah, loc. cit., p. 155b.
49. Shelah interprets a borrower as referring to a rasha, a wicked person, one who does not observe the Torah and its mitzvos. The Rebbe offers an interpretation that acknowledges the shortcomings of the spiritual counterpart of a borrower, but also applies it to one who observes the Torah and its mitzvos.
50.The statements in the main text are particularly appropriate according to the explanations of Shelah, Torah Shebichsav, loc. cit. and Asarah Maamaros, loc. cit. (see footnote 27), that the four watchmen parallel the four letters of G‑d’s name Havayah. (See Kehilas Yaakov – by the author of Melo HaRo’im – erech shomrim.) Consult Asarah Maamaros, loc. cit.
51.See footnote 29, above. The translation does not adequately communicate the meaning of the main text because of the idiomatic meaning of the Hebrew term used. As a noun, shomer has several meanings: “watchman,” “guard,” “caretaker,” and “observer,” and it can also serve as a verb with all these implications.
52.Bereishis 1:1.
53.Their claim need not be made as a request but as a demand to which they are rightfully entitled. See Berachos 17b.
54.Bava Metzia 7:1.
55.See Bava Metzia 86b, quoted by Rashi in his commentary on this mishnah.
56.See Rambam,HilchosSechirus 1:2. See Shelah, Tractate Pesachim, loc. cit., who describes the spiritual counterpart to liability due to circumstances beyond one’s control, a person whom G‑d punishes by taking away his free choice, “as we find with regard to Pharaoh and Sichon, whose hearts G‑d hardened.” (This follows Shelah’s interpretation of a borrower as referring to a wicked person. With regard to Pharaoh and Sichon, see Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:3ff.)
57. To clarify the distinction between an unpaid or paid watchman and a borrower: The watchmen are responsible to the owner of the object; they have agreed to perform a service for him. The borrower is obligated because of the object he took; his relationship with the owner is secondary.
58.Note Rashi, Bava Metzia 81a, s.v. shemirah bebaalim, which states that when one person tells another, “Lend an object to me… and I will lend an object to you,” this is not considered an instance where the owner of the entrusted object was employed in an enterprise of the borrower (shemirah bebaalim), because “the owner of the object is not working for the watchman (the borrower),” i.e., since the passage in Bava Metzia speaks about two borrowers, neither one is considered as “employed in the enterprise of the owner.” As a borrower, he is not performing work for the owner; he is acting in his own self-interest.
See also Nesivos HaMishpat 305:2 and Mayonei HaChochmah, Bava Metzia, loc. cit., which state that the borrower is watching the entrusted object for his own sake, because he derives all the benefit.
59. Note Tzafnas Panei’ach, K’llalei HaTorah VehaMitzvos, erech shomrim and the sources mentioned there which discuss whether the obligations of a watchman are incumbent on him because he indebted himself to the owner or because it is the Torah’s decree. See Machaneh Efraim, Hilchos Shaaleh UFikadon, sec. 1.
60. See Shelah, loc. cit., p. 155b, which compares Noach to a renter because he fulfilled G‑d’s will “solely so that the world will be maintained.”
Note the explanation Shelah, loc. cit., p. 155a, gives of the difference of opinion whether a renter is considered an unpaid or a paid watchman. Shelah states that “these and these are the words of the living G‑d.”
Building on his explanation that a renter is like one who says, “I am giving this sela to tzedekah so that my son will live,” he explains that the two opinions resemble two ways a person who makes such a gift could feel. The view that a borrower is an unpaid watchman refers to a person who resolves when making the gift to tzedekah that he is giving the gift, “whether his son lives or does not live” (see Rashi, Bava Basra 10b). The view that a borrower is a paid watchman refers to a person who does not make such a resolution.
61. In the business relationship, a renter receives an object that belongs to its owner and pays him for its use. A borrower acquires the object, as it were. Throughout the time it is in his possession, it is as if it were his. True, he must return it and is responsible for all types of loss, but that is comparable to paying for an article he purchased.
In the spiritual counterpart, the renter knows that he is living in G‑d’s world. True, he seeks to benefit from the world and sees his observance as payment for that benefit. However, he recognizes G‑d as the owner.
By contrast, the borrower sees the world as on loan to him. As long as he is alive, it is his. True, he has to “pay” G‑d, i.e., return the world to Him, but while alive he sees himself as the owner.
62. In the spiritual counterpart, the paid watchman does not desire to benefit from the world. However, he has not reached the level that he does not seek any benefit whatsoever. He wishes to benefit from serving G‑d.
63. By contrast, since the entire benefit is his, a borrower can be considered as one who “benefits from the words of the Torah,” one who uses the words of the Torah as “a hatchet with which to chop.” He is judged unfavorably; it is as if he “removes his life from the world” (Avos 4:5; Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah 3:10; the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:14). True, even in such an instance, our Sages said, “it is preferable for such a person… to engage in Torah study that outwardly is not for G‑d’s sake…, “for through involvement in the Torah that outwardly is not for G‑d’s sake, he will arrive at involvement in the Torah for G‑d’s sake” (the AlterRebbe’s ShulchanAruch,loc. cit.).
Nevertheless, those words are merely granting license, as the Alter Rebbe states there, “it is preferable for such a person… to engage in Torah study that outwardly is not for G‑d’s sake rather than to neglect it.”* By contrast, the observance of the Torah and its mitzvos that outwardly is not for G‑d’s sake practiced by a renter is the path of Divine service that is appropriate according to the natural order.
See Rambam’s Commentary to the Mishnah, the introduction to Sanhedrin, ch. 10, s.v. vehakat hachamishis, which elaborates on the concept that initially a person should be encouraged to perform Divine service, even though outwardly it is not for G‑d’s sake, because ultimately it will lead to Divine service performed for G‑d’s sake. Note the elaboration in that source. See similar concepts in Hilchos Teshuvah 10:5, which states that, initially, children “should only be taught to serve G‑d out of fear, i.e., in order to receive a reward.”
* Note Likkutei Sichos, Vol. 20, p. 49, which states that even the license to use the Torah as “a hatchet with which to chop” (Avos, loc. cit.) applies only in order to derive one’s livelihood – because that is a necessity – but not to achieve wealth. Consult that source.
64.Pesachim 50b; Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah 3:5, Hilchos Teshuvah, loc. cit.; the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, Hilchos Talmud Torah 4:3, and the sources cited there. See also the preceding footnote.
65.Ibid. 10:6.
66. Ibid. 10:2.
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