|
Translation:
1. Regarding the verse, “Hashem, your G-d will establish for you a prophet from your 2
midst, from your brothers, like me; you shall listen to him,” our sages teach:3
You shall listen to him: {From here we learn that} even if a prophet says to you:
Violate one of the mitzvos of the Torah -- for example, as in the case of Eliyahu at
Mount Carmel; regarding anything {a prophet permits} for a limited amount of 4
time, listen to him.
Regarding the verse, “Be careful not to offer your burnt offerings in any place that you 5
see fit,” the Sifri expounds:
But you may offer them in any place that the prophet tells you, as Eliyahu did on
Mount Carmel.6
Seemingly, this is perplexing: The Torah’s general command, “you shall listen to him,”
obligates a person to listen to a prophet who tells you to violate one of the mitzvos of the
Torah. Clearly this general command also obligates a person to listen to a prophet who
instructs you to offer a sacrifice on a private altar at a time when such altars were 7
prohibited. As such, why does the Sifri need to teach, by way of a specific exegetic 8
analysis (from the Torah’s precise terminology, “in any place that you see fit”), that you
may offer them in any place that the prophet tells you?
In explaining this, the Rogatchover Gaon quotes the Jerusalem Talmud:9
Only a prophet may permit bringing sacrificial offerings on a private altar {at a time
when private altars were prohibited}. What is the reason {that private altars were
deemed to be prohibited biblically}? “Be careful not to offer your burnt offerings in
any place that you see fit; {a sacrifice may be offered} only in the place....” How 10
could Eliyahu sacrifice at a time when private altars were prohibited? Rabbi Simlai
Debira said, Eliyahu said {to Hashem} “At Your word I have done -- I acted 11 12
according to what You have told me.”
The Rogatchover Gaon explains that the Jerusalem Talmud maintains that 13
“halachically, a person instructed by a prophet to offer sacrifices on a private altar during
Temple times may do so. Such sacrifices are not at all considered to be external
sacrifices; such sacrifices are valid.” In contrast, the Babylonian Talmud, mentioned 14
above disputes this point. On this basis, according to the Jerusalem Talmud, this law 15
falls under the rubric of laws of private altars: A prophet’s instruction {to offer sacrifices
at a private altar} has the power to uproot the prohibition against private altars “during
Temple times,” and such sacrifices would be as valid as they would have been prior to
the entry of the Jewish people to Jerusalem. Clearly, this novel law requires specific 16
exegesis, and cannot be learned from the phrase “you shall listen to him,” for the intent
of this phrase is not to give a prophet license to uproot a prohibition; rather, it serves to
teach of the obligation to listen to a prophet and violate a prohibition. In contrast,
according to the Babylonian Talmud, a prophet’s instruction {to offer sacrifices at a
private altar} does not have the power to uproot the prohibition against private altars,
and this law falls under the rubric of laws of prophecy: On the basis of a prophet’s
instruction, a person is obligated to temporarily violate the Torah. Consequently, the
obligation to listen to a prophet’s instruction to offer sacrifices at a private altar -- just like
all {the obligation to violate all} other prohibitions {upon instruction from a prophet} -- is
subsumed under the Torah’s general command to listen to him.
On this basis, the Sifrei’s analysis is understood clearly -- the Sifrei disputes the position
of the Babylonian Talmud. The Sifrei maintains that Eliyahu at Mount Carmel cannot be
cited as an example of the general command to listen to him, even if he tells you to
violate one of the mitzvos of the Torah.
2. However, this is unclear: The Sifrei also quotes the above teaching based on the phrase
“you shall listen to him,” and also uses Eliyahu at Mount Carmel as an exemplar! Thus, it
is impossible to say that the authority who expounds the phrase “you shall listen to him”
disputes the teaching that “you may offer them in any place that the prophet tells you.”
In light of the above, we must say that according to the opinion of the Sifrei, and
consequently, also according to the opinion of the Babylonian Talmud, this law falls
under the rubric of laws of private altars. That is a sacrifice offered on a private altar
upon instruction from a prophet would be valid (as will be explained below in section 5).
[Finding agreement among these authorities is especially pertinent based on the general
rule that we should always attempt to find agreement between the positions of the
Babylonian Talmud and the Jerusalem Talmud (and the Sifrei, etc.), even if by means of
a strained argument.] This will be clarified by prefacing with an explanation of a difficult
issue at the conclusion of tractate Zevachim (which demonstrates that the Babylonian
Talmud agrees {with the position of the Jerusalem Talmud regarding this matter}.
A substantial part of the conclusion of Zevachim covers details concerning the laws of
private altars. Seemingly, this is perplexing: The Talmud there teaches explicitly that 17
“When the Jewish people reached Jerusalem {and built the Temple during the reign of
Shlomo Hamelech}, private altars became prohibited, and never again were permitted.”
As such, why did our sages instruct us about the laws of private altars at length and in
such detail -- how is this knowledge practical nowadays? (As the Talmud often asks:)18
What was in the past, is past!? From this {lengthy and detailed treatment of private alars
in the Talmud} it is clear that also in our times, it is halachically possible to offer
sacrifices on a private altar, and so we need to know these laws in detail.
Our sages taught us one method of offering sacrifices on private altars that would be
acceptable today:
And nowadays gentiles are permitted to do so (i.e., to sacrifice animals on a
private altar).... As the Sages taught {with regard to the verses that prohibit the
slaughter of offerings outside the Temple}: “Speak {to Aharon, and to his sons,
and} to all the children of Israel” -- {this indicates that only} Jews are 19
commanded not to slaughter offerings outside the Temple, but gentiles are not
commanded to refrain from slaughtering offerings outside the Temple. Therefore,
each and every gentile may construct a private altar for himself, and sacrifice
upon it whatever {animal} he desires... it is prohibited for a Jew to assist them or
to act as their agent {in this matter, as sacrificing in this manner is forbidden for a
Jew}.... But to instruct them how to sacrifice outside the Temple is permitted.20
Since Jews are permitted to instruct gentiles how to offer sacrifices on private altars
today, Jews must be fully conversant with the detailed laws of these sacrifices.
However it is far-fetched to suppose that the Talmud teaches us at such great length
about the laws of private altars in order for us to instruct gentiles! Although many issues
discussed and legislated by the Talmud involve unusual, uncommon, or even extremely
remote situations, these issues do involve mitzvah obligations and halachic
determinations, and liability, etc. Thus, the Talmud must explain and clarify these issues
(so that a person knows how to act if these situations were to materialize). Furthermore,
the Talmud must discuss even situations that “never happened and never will be,” to
clarify the halacha in case such situations do occur.
But this concern does not apply to an uncommon occurrence that does not involve
halachic liability or a prohibition, such as in our case (if a gentile should want to
staunchly abide by the Torah’s laws while offering a sacrifice on a private altar today).
The likelihood of this ever happening is extremely remote, and even if it did come to
pass, Jews are not obligated to instruct gentiles how to offer their sacrifices (as the
Talmud writes: “Jews are permitted to instruct gentiles”). It is quite far-fetched to
suppose that despite this {unlikely scenario not involving an obligation}, the Talmud
discusses private altars at such great length {just to enable Jews to guide gentiles}.
Additionally {according to the halacha}, issues of practical relevance have precedence 21
when engaging in talmudic discussion for the sake of determining halacha, etc. In light of
this, the entire talmudic discussion seeking a halachic determination regarding the laws
of a private altar could only have taken place at such a time that the sages had no
doubts whatsoever regarding any talmudic laws relating to the Jewish people, etc.!
Additionally, and most significantly: Several of the laws relating to private altars are
learned from scriptural passages beginning, “speak to the Children of Israel.” As such,
just as the general law, that gentiles are permitted to offer sacrifices on a private altar
today is learned from a parsha that begins, speak to the Children of Israel -- not to
gentiles, the specific laws of these private altars (learned from scriptural passages that
state speak to the Children of Israel) apply only to the private altars of Jews -- not to the
private altars of gentiles. In light of this, the difficulty raised earlier regarding the
Talmud’s discussion of the laws of private altars -- What was in the past, is past!? -- still
stands entirely unresolved.
3. Nonetheless, there is another possibility of offering sacrifices on a private altar, even
when doing so is otherwise prohibited -- upon the instruction of a prophet. Although the
sages taught, “After the last prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi died, the Divine 22
Spirit {of prophetic revelation} departed from the Jewish people,” implying, seemingly,
that for a prophet to arise afterward would be impossible -- this is not so. For several
explicit statements of our sages attest to the fact that the Divine Spirit came to rest {upon
individual Jews} even after the passing of the last prophets. Therefore, we must explain
that the sages’ teaching, the Divine Spirit departed from the Jewish people means that
from the time of the last prophets, prophecy was not as prevalent as it was previously;
not that it departed entirely. Meaning: Classical prophecy comes only to a person who
has refined his character, and has cultivated within himself several extraordinary virtues
in preparation for prophecy, as explained by Rambam. {To that end, the Talmud asks} 23
-- Have the later generations improved {their spiritual level}? (A rhetorical question.) 24
{The Talmud attests:} “If the early generations are {characterized as} sons of angels, 25
we are the sons of men....” People may not be fit {generally} to receive prophecy,
however, prophetic revelation did not cease due to a decree from Above.
In light of the above, the terminology of the phrase the Divine Spirit departed from the
Jewish people is precise. Our sages do not say that the Divine Spirit was nullified or
ceased (terms the Talmud uses regarding several other matters that were nullified)
because prophetic revelation was not nullified and did not cease. Rather, prophecy
disappeared from the world because people were unworthy.
But if a person would be worthy of receiving prophecy, then even today, the Divine Spirit
and prophecy would come to rest upon him.
On this basis, it is clear why Rambam never mentions that prophecy ceased upon the
death of the last prophets (until the time before Moshiach arrives), even though Rambam
explains many details regarding prophecy. Although Rambam does mention a situation
in which prophetic revelation is impeded, “it is possible that prophecy will not rest,” he 26
doesn't even allude to prophecy being impossible today. On the contrary: After
enumerating the necessary conditions for prophecy, he concludes, “the spirit of prophecy will immediately rest upon him,” suggesting that prophecy depends on those 27 conditions alone, and on nothing else.
Further, Rambam explains in Iggeres Teiman:28
In Bilam's prophecy, the verse "In time, it will be said to Yaakov and Yisrael, 29
‘What has Hashem has wrought?’" contains a veiled allusion: After the lapse of 30
an interval equal to the time that passed from the Six Days of Creation to Bilam's
day, prophecy will return to the Jewish people.... Bilam uttered this prophecy in
the thirty-eighth year after the Exodus, which corresponds to the year 2488 after
the Creation of the World. According to the interpretation of this chronology, 31
prophecy would be restored to Israel in the year 4976, after the creation of the
world.32
Here, Rambam explicitly states his opinion that prophetic revelation is not only possible
today; rather, “prophecy will return to the Jewish people.”
Additionally, and most significantly: Rambam writes further in that text (Iggeres Teiman)
about a person (who lived close to Rambam’s time) who made several prophetic
predictions, and all of his predictions came true. Rambam continues: “This miracle
(described previously -- regarding this man who prophesied) convinced all the people
that he was undoubtedly a prophet.” Not only did Rambam have a tradition received 33
from his father, “that he received from his father and from his grandfather, which
Rambam accepted as true,” that prophecy would return to the Jewish people, but
Rambam also testifies that close to his time, there lived a man who was “undoubtedly a
prophet.”34
On this basis, at any time a prophet may appear and give instructions to offer a sacrifice
on a private altar. This is why the Talmud discusses the detailed laws of private altars.
4. Nonetheless, even in light of the above, this explanation is still strained. Only once in
history has a prophet given a “time-limited command” to offer sacrifices on a private 35 altar.
Does this one-time event justify the Talmud’s lengthy discussion of the laws of a
private altar in anticipation of the possibility that another prophet will appear and
command us to offer sacrifices on a private altar?
Additionally, should a prophet appear and command us to offer sacrifices on a private
altar today, we would clearly be obligated to listen to him also regarding the laws of
private altars, modifying or omitting them were he to command us to do so. This is
because the entire idea {of offering sacrifices on a private altar} at such a time would be
antithetical to the Torah’s laws. But when a prophet gives us a time-limited command,
we are, at such a time, obligated to do the opposite of what the Torah’s laws dictate.
Thus, it is very likely that {were such a prophet to appear} he would give us a time-limited
command instructing us regarding the details of offering sacrifices on a private altar.
All of these issues are resolved by finding in favor of the opinion that a prophet’s
command to offer a sacrifice at a private altar at a time when doing so is prohibited does
not violate the Torah, and does not fall under the rubric of the laws of prophecy which
has departed {from the Jewish people}, etc. Rather, this is a detail falling under the rubric
of the laws of private altars. From the outset, this law teaches that we are permitted (and
commanded) to offer a sacrifice on a private altar upon instruction by a prophet, and all
of the laws of private altars apply to such a sacrifice. Consequently, it is clear that we
need to know all the details of the laws of private altars.
On this basis, {we are to study the laws of private altars} not because of any concern
(that perhaps a prophet will appear and command us to offer sacrifices on a private
altar). Rather, this {possibility of a prophet appearing and commanding us to bring a
sacrifice on a private altar} falls under the rubric of the laws of private altars. Therefore, it
is of no concern to us that the likelihood of this ever happening is extremely remote --
just as we must clarify all the details of all of the Torah’s laws, even details relating to
unlikely occurrences, we must also clarify this detail in the laws of private altars (as the
Talmud does) despite it being unlikely to occur, as discussed above.
Expressed somewhat differently: Prophecy today is considered unlikely to occur, and is
speculative, etc. In contrast, regarding a private altar, it’s just that -- a lion (prohibits it,
by) crouching upon it .36
Moreover, we find that the command “you may not allow any soul to live” is included in 37
the count of the 613 mitzvos, even though “a person could think that this commandment
does not apply for future generations.” As Rambam explains: 38
A command that can be fulfilled without being limited to a certain time is not
considered inapplicable to future generations, because if the act would
become possible in any generation, the mitzvah would apply....39
5. In light of all the above, it is clear that the Babylonian Talmud is of this opinion,40
because the law of private altars as initially given {by Hashem} sanctions this
scenario of a prophet’s command to offer sacrifices on a private altar. Despite our
sages’ statement, “even if a prophet says to you: Violate one of the mitzvos of the
Torah -- for example, as in the case of Eliyahu at Mount Carmel,” the Talmud doesn’t
mean that even after a person is instructed by a prophet to offer sacrifices on a private
altar, a person violates Torah’s mitzvah (of private altars) when he offers such a sacrifice
but that the Torah’s mitzvah is set aside as a result of the prophet’s command. Rather 41
(as mentioned above), if a prophet appears and commands a person to violate one of
the Torah’s mitzvos, the prophet’s command {actually} permits, however, the offering of
a sacrifice on a private altar. Moreover, by then offering this sacrifice, a person also
fulfills the mitzvah of offering a sacrifice, aside from the mitzvah to obey a prophet.
And this is learned from the verse, “Be careful not to offer your burnt offerings in any
place that you see fit.”
Expressed somewhat differently: This novelty -- that a prophet can command a person to
offer sacrifices on a private altar at a time when doing so is prohibited, and that the
Jewish people are obligated to listen to the prophet -- is learned from the phrase “you
shall listen to him.” This is a detail in the laws of prophecy, as is the authority of a
prophet to command a person to violate other Torah mitzvos. After learning that we
must listen to him {a prophet} when he instructs us to offer sacrifices on a private altar,
the Torah instructs us regarding private altars that “you may offer them in any place that
the prophet tells you” -- permitting and commanding us, as a detail in the laws of private
altars.
6. Based on the above explanation (that two mitzvos are relevant to the offering of
sacrifices on a private altar upon a prophet’s instruction: [ a) you shall listen to him and
b) the Torah’s instruction regarding private altars]), it is clear that offering sacrifices on a
private altar upon instruction by a prophet enjoys an advantage over offering sacrifices
on a private altar at a time when such altars were permitted. (This advantage is not only
“quantitative” -- he fulfills two mitzvos -- but also “qualitative,” in terms of the sacrifice): 42
Obligatory sacrifices may not be offered on a private altar. Meaning, the level of 43
sanctity of a private altar, is insufficient for (offering) a person’s obligatory sacrifices,
although it suffices for a person to fulfill the mitzvah of offering voluntary sacrifices. This
distinction is only with respect to a person -- but regarding the rituals (and activities)
involved in an obligatory sacrifice, these same rituals can be performed when sacrificing
(a voluntary offering) on a private altar.
In contrast, offering a sacrifice on a private altar based on a prophet’s command is itself
(akin to) an obligatory offering. In other words: The sanctity (of the sacrificial act and) of
the altar does not just affect the sacrifice; it also affects the person {offering the
sacrifice} when he fulfills the command that Hashem placed upon him -- the command
“you shall listen to him {a prophet}.”
This is similar to the distinction between offering a sacrifice on a private altar or in the
Holy Temple:
Offering a sacrifice on a private altar does not cause the sanctity {of the offering} to
extend to the place where the sacrifice is offered; we do not consider the locations where
private altars operated in the past to be holy places. In contrast, offering sacrifices on the
Temple altar has the advantage of bringing sanctity to its location. Meaning, a sacrifice
offered on a private altar is unable to diffuse sanctity outwards; in contrast, a sacrifice
offered in the Holy Temple does so.
This is similar to the distinction between offering sacrifices on a private altar when such
sacrifices were permitted, and offering sacrifices on a private altar based on a prophet’s
command: Sacrifices offered on a private altar generically {when they were permitted}
were unable to have an external effect -- on the person {offering them}; in contrast,
sacrifices offered based on a prophet’s command also affected the person.
7. In light of what was mentioned above -- that the sugya44
concluding tractate Zevachim
deals primarily with the laws governing the offering of sacrifices on a private altar on the
word of a prophet (and not generic laws pertaining to private altars) -- the connection
between the conclusion and the beginning of the tractate is also clearly understood. The
tractate begins:
“All sacrifices that were slaughtered without proper mindfulness {i.e., during the 45
slaughtering, the slaughter intended to offer a different sort of sacrifice} are fit
{and one may carry on with their remaining sacrificial rites and partake of their
meat, as applicable}. But such a sacrifice does not satisfy the obligation of its
owner {who is therefore required to bring another offering}.46
A sacrifice that was slaughtered without proper mindfulness is deficient in that it cannot
satisfy the obligation of the person offering it, i.e., it lacks the ability to affect the person.
This deficiency (discussed at the beginning of the tractate) is especially blatant in light of
the laws taught at the end of the tractate: Even when a person offers a sacrifice on a
private altar (with the sayso of a prophet -- the primary discussion of the conclusion of
the tractate) sanctity is drawn upon the person. (This despite the fact that, in general, a
sacrifice offered on a private altar does not have the ability to extend sanctity outwards,
nor does its sanctity have the same effect as a sacrifice offered in the Holy Temple.)
How much more so {when a person offers sacrifices} in the Holy Temple, whose
principal function (sacrifices) is a communal (and individual) obligation -- such sacrifices
affect the person, drawing sanctity upon him.
8. There is a tremendous power of holiness in offering (obligatory) sacrifices in the Holy
Temple, or on a private altar when instructed to do so by a prophet, etc., affecting a
person offering such sacrifices, and the places in which they are offered. Synagogues
and batei midrash possess similar virtues, as they are “miniature Temples.” People 47 48
pray there (prayers were established corresponding to the daily sacrifices {offered
in the Holy Temple} and study Torah there (and both prayer and Torah study are 49
continual, similar to {the activities of} the Holy Temple, where the continual sacrifice50
was offered -- in addition to sharing traits with private altars). Sanctity is drawn into
synagogues and batei midrash themselves, remaining there afterwards {i.e., after
prayers and Torah study have concluded}, and affect the people {who later enter these
places}. In light of this {lasting effect}, it is clear that acts of holiness performed in these
places enjoy a greater measure of sanctity {than if they would have been performed
elsewhere}.
From this, we learn a practical lesson. Evidently, performing acts of holiness etc. within
the precincts of synagogues and batei midrash is preferable to performing such acts
(even with the same level of meticulousness etc.) elsewhere. When performed in a place
of greater sanctity, the {intrinsic} holiness of these acts is augmented by the {extrinsic}
sanctity of the place.
By drawing the sanctity of our “miniature Temples” into the world, and spreading this
sanctity outwards throughout the time of Exile, we merit building of the Third Temple
from which we will draw sanctity by offering actual sacrifices. Since {Hashem promises
that} at that time, “I will remove the spirit of impurity from the earth,” all these sacrifices 51
will be offered “with the proper mindfulness,” “according to the mitzvah of Your will.” 52
The sanctity of these sacrifices, etc., will be drawn upon also the people offering them,
and the people will be elevated, ascent following ascent, drawing near to Hashem.
-Based on a sicha delivered on the 20th of Menachem Av, 5729 (1969).
From ProjectLikkuteiSichos - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PSibeCI4YfRV67eplmS2iZ_h78k_3lcZ/view
Footnotes:
1 And siyyum of tractate Zevachim.
2 Devarim 18:15.
3 Yevamos 90b; Sifrei on Devarim 18:15.
4 Eliyahu offered a sacrifice to Hashem on Mount Carmel during a period when bringing sacrifice offerings outside the Temple was forbidden.
5 Devarim 12:13.
6 Sifrei “Devarim” 70:3.
7 A private altar is an altar situated anywhere outside of the Mishkan or the Temple courtyard.
8 According to Zevachim 112b, offering sacrifices on private altars was prohibited during the time the Mishkan functioned in the desert; permitted when the Mishkan was established at Gilgal; prohibited when the Mishkan stood at Shilo; permitted when the Mishkan stood at Nov and Giv’on; and finally, prohibited from the First Temple was built, and onwards.
9 Megillah 1:11; similarly, Vayikra Rabbah 22:9.
10 Devarim 12:13-14.
11 According to a variant version of the text, the text reads: “Rabbi Simlai said, ‘Dibura,’” connoting Divine speech, meaning, Eliyau acted based on Hashem’s word, as the verse attests: “At Your word I have done.”
12 I Melachim 18:36.
13 Tzafnas Pane’ach “Hilchos Matnos Ani’im 2:18, p. 124 (quoted in Tzafnas Pane’ach on the Torah on this verse).
14 I.e. Sacrifices offered outside the Temple, during Temple times, which are invalid.
15 Yevamos 90b, quotes at the beginning of section 1: “If a prophet says to you: Violate one of the mitzvos of the Torah...,” implying that the sacrifice offered under these circumstances is a violation, and is not considered valid.
16 I.e., when the Mishkan was located in Nov or Givon. Zevachim 112b.
17 Babylonian Talmud, Zevachim 112b.
18 Yoma 5b.
19 Vayikra 17:2.
20 Zevachim 115b, 116b.
21 Shulchan Aruch “Yoreh De’ah” 246:10-15.
22 Yoma 9b; Sotah 48b; Tosefta “Sotah” 13:4; Sanhedrin 11a.
23 Mishneh Torah “Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah” ch. 7; Shemonah Perakim ch. 7; Moreh Nevuchim 2:32; Introduction
to Peirush HaMishnayos.
24 See Yevamos 39b and Chulin 93b, where this question is posed rhetorically.
25 Shabbos 112b.
26 Mishneh Torah “Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah” 7:5.
27 Ibid., 7:1.
28 Par. 12.
29 Ka’et” in the Hebrew original, literally, “like this time.”
30 Bamidbar 23:23.
31 Iggeres Teiman provides a Hebrew mnemonic for this number, BTiPaCh geulim.
32 See footnote 22 in the original for an analysis of this calculation, based on other sources and other versions.
33 Iggeres Teiman par. 13.
34 Ibid., par. 12.
35 Hora’as sha’ah” in the Hebrew original.
36 Based on Eruvin 88b. This phrase means that just as a lion crouching at an opening does not thereby nullify its status as an entrance, in practice no one can pass through it. So too in our case, the unlikeliness of prophecy today does not make study of the laws of private altars unnecessary; but application of this law in practice is unlikely.
37 Devarim 20:16.
38 Rambam “Sefer HaMitzos” positive mitzvah 187.
39 Ibid.
40 The opinion that a prophet’s command to offer a sacrifice at a private altar at a time when doing so is prohibited
does not violate the Torah.
41 “Dechuyah” in the Hebrew original.
42 The mitzvah of offering a sacrifice as well as the mitzvah to listen to a prophet, as above in section 5.
43 Zevachim 117a-b.
44 A sugya is a passage in the Gemara consisting of a set of arguments discussing a particular issue or Mishna.
45 In the original, “לשמן שלא “,usually translated as “not for their own sake.”
46 Zevachim 2a.
47 Literally, houses of study, i.e., yeshivas, kollels or other places designated for Torah study.
48 “Mikdash me’at” in the Hebrew original. Megillah 29a.
49 The prayers parallel the offerings, in terms of both time and characteristics. Berachos 26b.
50 “Tamid,” in the Hebrew original, literally, continual. This refers to the twice-daily communal offering.
51 Zechariah 13:2.
52 I.e. with no ulterior motives.
|