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Chumash-ShmotSummary
(5734) Rashi (Ex 22:24) "When you lend money to My people" (and its reconcilliation with Rashi Yitro 20:22)
Translation
1. In his commentary on the verse teaching of the obligation to extend loans, Rashi quotes
the following words: “If1 you lend money to my people.”2 Rashi then goes on to quote an
explanation of this verse: “Rabbi Yishmael says: ‘Every single “if” in the Torah3 implies
something optional, except for three places that imply an obligation, and our verse is
one of those three instances.’”
It would seem that Rashi’s intention is to clarify the seemingly odd phrasing in the verse.
Why would the Torah write, “ if you lend money”, which implies that it is a person’s
choice whether to lend money or not? We know that performing acts of kindness4 is an
obligatory mitzvah ; therefore, the verse should have expressed this mitzvah as an
obligation, and not as a choice. Rashi explains that in this verse, “if” does not imply
something optional, as it does elsewhere; since the topic of this verse is the obligation
to lend, the word “if” is to be understood as implying an obligation. To alleviate the
difficulty of giving such an uncommon translation of this word, Rashi explains that “if”
implies an obligation in three other places in the Torah: “And if you make for me an altar
of stones”;5 “And if you bring a meal offering of the first grains…”;6 as well as the verse
at hand.
However, we need to understand the following:
● There are many other places throughout Torah that the word “if” cannot be understood
as implying something optional. Yet, in those places Rashi does not explain that they
are obligatory. For example, when Hashem tells Cain, “ If you improve, it will be forgiven
you ,”7 the intention is that certainly Cain will improve; it is his obligation to do so. The
verses, “Now if you will listen, yes listen to my voice...”;8 and “ If you walk in my
statutes…,”9 are all clearly understood to be obligations. So why does Rashi explain that
the word “if” is to be understood as an obligation only in our parsha (10and at the end of
parshas Yisro )?
● Rashi explicitly writes in his commentary to our verse, “Every single “if” in the Torah
implies something optional, except for three places,” yet Rashi himself explains “if”
does not imply something optional but rather an obligation, in five places in the Torah
(in addition to the the places mentioned above)! On the verse, “If an atonement fine is
levied upon him,”11 Rashi comments: “The word “if” implies an obligation, similar to the
verse, ‘If you lend money.’ It is to be understood to mean “when,”12 and it teaches us
that the Jewish court is obligated to assess a fine for damage caused by a person’s
animal. Similarly, regarding the verse, “And if you bring a meal offering of the first
grains…”13 Rashi explains, “The word “if” means “when,” because bringing this offering
is not optional. So, too, the verse ‘If the children of Israel will have a Jubilee’”14 implies
that the Jewish people will have a Jubilee.
● Since Rashi’s commentary only relates to the words, “If you lend money,” why does
Rashi cite the words “to my people” as part of his opening quote15 of the verse? The
words “to my people” seem unrelated to his commentary.
● There is a well known rule mentioned in previous sichos that in the vast majority of
cases, Rashi does not mention the name of the author of the interpretation whom he
cites. When (uncharacteristically) Rashi does note the name of the author of a teaching,
he does so in order to further clarify our understanding of the verse. What do we learn
from the fact that Rabbi Yismael is the author of this teaching?
2. In the previous parsha , the verse states: “And if you make for Me an altar…,”16 and
there Rashi cites the teaching of Rabbi Yishmael for the first time .17 Rashi’s more
extensive quotation there continues: “In this context, the word ‘if’ means ‘when,’... for
you have an obligation to build an altar of stones, as the verse states: ‘You shall build of
whole stones.’18 Similarly, the verse ‘If you lend money’ is obligatory, as the verse
states: ‘And you shall lend, yes lend him’.... Similarly, ‘And if you bring a meal offering of
the first grains’19 -- this refers to the omer offering, which is obligatory.”20
Rashi’s commentary above also needs clarification:
● Why doesn’t Rashi bring a verse to prove that the omer is an obligation, as he does
regarding the obligations to build an altar and lend money?
● Why did Rashi choose to prove that building a stone altar is an obligation from the verse
“You shall build of whole stones,”21 and not from the previous verse, “You shall build
there… an altar of stones.”?22
● Why does Rashi note the name of the author, Rabbi Yishmael in that place ?
3. To explain all the above, we must understand Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule” that the Torah’s
use of the term “if” implies something optional, except for three cases. His rule only
applies in instances where “if” is written in the context of option and obligation. In such
cases, “if” can be construed to imply something optional (using the conventional
meaning of the word “if”), or it can be construed to imply something obligatory,
(understanding “if” to mean “when,” in the three cases specified by Rabbi Yishmael).
However, there are other cases in which the word “if” appears as part of a story , or as
a condition . The word “if” could also appear in the framework of an obligation, but it is
clear from the context that the term “if” does not imply an obligation . Rabbi Yishmael
never intended his rule to apply to these cases.
There are many verses in which the meaning of the word “if” is made obvious by the
context: “Except if the bread that he eats...,”23 “ If an animal, if a person…,”24 (verses
already known to a Torah student25), in which the word “if” is understood to mean
“however”; “only”; or “or.” These verses could not be misconstrued to be written in an
optional or an obligatory context.
The same applies to the following verses (although the word “if” is used differently).
Hashem tells Kayin, “ If you improve, it will be forgiven you. ”26 Hashem is not
commanding Kayin to improve his conduct, since it is obvious that he must, and he
does not have to be told to do so. Rather, this verse is a continuation of the dialogue
between Hashem and Kayin, “Why has your face fallen?” Hashem informs Kayin that
obtaining forgiveness for his sin is up to him: “If you improve, it will be forgiven you.”
Here, too, from the context it is clear that “if” is not meant in terms of optionality or
obligation.
Similarly, the following verses do not imply obligation: “If you listen, yes listen to my
voice…”27; and “If you walk in my statutes…”28; the intent of these verses is not is not to
inform us of the obligation to listen to Hashem and observe his laws. These obligations
were commanded previously , in various Torah verses. The intent of these verses is to
predicate the reward described in the verses that follow, upon fulfilling the conditions
set out in these verses: “If you listen…” then “you will be my treasured people”;29 “If you
walk in my statutes” then “I will give your rains in their time.”30
In summary, when reason dictates that the intent of a verse is not to imply an obligation,
such as in the above verses, the word “if” is to be understood in its plain sense, as a
condition. Such verses are not governed by Rabbi Yishmael’s rule regarding “option”
and “obligation.”
4. There is, however, a limitation on the Torah’s use of the word “if” as a condition. “If” can
be understood as conditional only when the Torah uses the word “if” in connection with
an issue whose obligatory nature is already known, either based on previous verses, or
due to the obvious nature of the obligation in that case. But in a case where we are
unfamiliar as to whether the subject is obligatory or not, it is not reasonable to say that
“if” implies a condition.
Rabbi Yishmael’s three exceptions are examples of cases in which the status of
something as obligatory or optional is not known to us. Although the verse “ If you lend
money to my people…” might be (erroneously) interpreted as conditional (based on the
conclusion of the verse, “...you shall not charge him interest”),31 the fact that prior to this
point, the Torah did not inform us that performing acts of kindness is obligatory,
indicates that the word “if” in this verse is not to be understood as conditional. For it
would not make sense for the Torah to predicate another commandment (not to charge
interest) upon a prior statement (regarding extending loans), the obligatory status of
which remains ambiguous.32
That is why Rashi explains that the word “if” in this verse implies an obligation (as it is
to be understood as saying “ when you lend money”). This is different than “every [other]
“if” in the Torah,” described in Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule” (which, as detailed above, only
applies in cases where the obligatory status is unambiguous).
Similarly, it cannot be argued that the word “if” in the verse, “And if you make for Me an
altar of stones...”33 implies a condition, upon which the phrase which follows, “you shall
not build them of hewn stones,” depends, because we don’t know at this point in the
Torah if building an altar is obligatory. Likewise, the word “if” in the verse, “And If you
bring a meal offering of the first grains”34 cannot be understood as implying a condition.
At the point that this verse appears in the Torah, the mitzvah obligating the omer
offering has not been given. Therefore, this verse should not be understood as a
condition upon which the phrase which follows, “ as soon as it ripens, parched over the
fire,” depends.
The word “if” in all three of these verses, the exceptions to Rabbi Yishmael’s rule, have
been shown to imply an obligation, and not something optional. They are to be
understood to mean “when,” rather than “if.”
5. Based on the above, we now understand why Rashi in parshas Yisro quotes verses that
appear later in the Torah, which explicitly state that acts of kindness and the building of
an altar are obligatory, yet he does not quote a verse stating that the omer offering is
obligatory. He quotes these verses regarding acts of kindness and building an altar to
emphasize that Torah will later instruct us that these are obligatory, and to inform us
that the Torah had not indicated that these commandments are obligatory prior to the
verses that appear in our parsha . Rashi’s reason for quoting these verses is to caution
us against interpreting the word “if” in these verses as implying something conditional,
based on the above reasoning.35 (His purpose for quoting these verses is not to prove
that these commandments are obligatory.)36
The reason Rashi informs us that prior to our parsha the Torah had not yet indicated
that acts of kindness and building an altar are obligatory, is because we would have
mistakenly thought that these commandments were already known to be obligatory,
based on verses in Sefer Bereishis . Regarding Avraham, the Torah writes earlier : “ For I
have known him because he commands his sons and his household after him… to
perform tzedaka37 and justice….”38 Regarding Ya’akov, the Torah writes earlier : “he
took the stone ... and he set it up as a monument.”39 Rashi therefore had to inform us
that the commandments establishing acts of kindness and the building of an altar as
obligatory, only appear later in the Torah. Rashi does not need to quote a verse
indicating the obligatory nature of the omer sacrifice, because there is no earlier verse
referring to the omer sacrifice.
6. Based on the above approach40 that Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule” is limited to a context
determined clearly to be either optional or obligatory, it is understood that word “if” does
not imply an obligation in the verse “If the children of Israel will have a Jubilee.”41 The
Jubilee year (when it was in force) came about automatically, and was not dependent
upon human choice or action. It is clear, then, that the word “if” in the verse does not
imply obligation or optionality.
From the perspective of human involvement, the word “if” in the context of the Jubilee is
much different than in the context of the three exceptions to Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule.”42
Nonetheless, the definition of the word “if” is similar in all four verses. “If the children of
Israel will have a Jubilee” is to be understood to mean, “ when the children of Israel will
have a Jubilee.”43 All four verses refer to a certainty, not to a case of doubt. (The
difference between them is that in the three exceptions of Rabbi Yishmael, the word “if”
implies an obligation, and in the verse about the Jubilee, the word “if” refers to an
occurrence that will certainly take place, albeit automatically.)44
Therefore, when Rashi explains the usage of the word “if” in the verse, “And if you bring
a meal offering of the first grains,”45 and Rashi explains, “The word “if” means “when,”
he brings an example of the verse, “If the children of Israel will have a Jubilee”46
because the word “if” also means “when” in that verse. (Clearly, Rashi’s intent is not to
compare these verses in terms of obligation , because the Jubilee occurs automatically.)
As well, in the verse, “If an atonement fine is levied upon him,”47 the word “if” is not
included under Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule”, even though “His sentence is that the court
levy an atonement fine upon him,”48 the term “obligation” does not apply in this case.
The term “obligation” is applied only to commonplace, routine situations, in which a
person is obligated to do something specific. In our case, an atonement fine only
comes about by happenstance , (an uncommon event, which runs contrary to the
natural order of the world). When a person’s ox gores and kills a person, the owner is
tried by the court, which then pronounces his sentence. We would not say that the
sentence is an obligation on the court. Since there is not not in the realm of an
obligation, it does not fall under the “rule” of Rabbi Yishmael.
Still, the meaning of the word “if” in the law of the atonement fine is similar in its
meaning in Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule.” In both cases, the word “if” implies the need for
certainty that a particular event has taken place. (A fine is imposed only after the court
has ascertained that the person’s ox killed someone; and the prohibition of interest only
apples after a loan has been given). That is why in explaining the use of “if” in this case,
Rashi compares it to the case of lending money, teaching: “This “if” is not meant as
conditional; but it is like its use in the verse, “If you lend money.”
7. An explanation is still needed as to why Rashi cites the words “to my people” as part of
his opening quote on the verse requiring a person to lend money. The words “to my
people” seem unrelated to his commentary. Even though the Torah obligates us to
perform acts of kindness, it would still be possible for a person to erroneously interpret
“if you lend money” as implying something optional, if this verse also applied to lending
money to gentiles. One might have thought that the verse uses the word “if” in order to
imply an option; because gentiles are included in this law, it is different than other acts
of kindness, which are obligatory.
In order to disabuse readers of that impression, Rashi cites the words “to my people,”
clearly refuting the above misinterpretation. As Rashi clearly teaches, “This is the
meaning of this verse: ‘When you lend money,’ lend it to ‘My people,’ and not to a
gentile.” Rashi cites the words “to my people” as proof that this verse refers only to
loans to Jews,49 and we are thus compelled to conclude that the word “if” implies an
obligation, and not an option.
After all that has been said, there is yet another reason (to be discussed below)50 for
interpreting the word “if” as implying that lending is optional, and not obligatory. Rashi
negates that reason by citing the author of his interpretation: “ Rabbi Yishmael says…”
Rashi cites him by name to hint to us that it is impossible for this verse to imply that
lending money is optional, as such an interpretation would run contrary to Rabbi
Yishmael’s position, as will be explained below.
8. The parsha of the manna51 (which a student, studying the Torah sequentially, has
already learned), helps shed light on this issue. There, we read of Moshe commanding
the Jeiwsh people to store the manna: “ Let one omer of it be preserved for your
generations.” Rashi comments on the words “for your generations”: “In the days of
Jeremiah, when Jeremiah rebuked them, saying ‘Why do you not engage in the Torah?’
They would say, ‘Shall we leave our work and engage in the Torah? From what will we
support ourselves?’ He brought out to them the jug of manna. He said to them, ... ‘With
this, your ancestors supported themselves. Hashem has many agents to prepare food
for those who fear Him.’"52
Rashi’s explanation ostensibly demonstrates that Jewish people should not work for a
living; they should be involved in Torah study full-time, and Hashem will provide them
with sustenance, similar to the manna . It is self-understood that when a person
conducts himself according to the dictates of the Torah, with complete and true devotion
to the Torah and its commandments, Hashem will provide him with all of his needs in a
manner similar to the Jewish people when they ate the manna, and he will not need to
rely on charity and human kindness. However, if his needs are not fulfilled completely
by Hashem and he needs to borrow money to sustain himself, his hardship indicates
that his conduct does not meet the Torah’s expectations . (Rather, he involved himself
in worldly matters, and he worked at making a living through natural means.)
This way of thinking implies that lending money is not an obligation, because a person
who adheres to the Torah’s commandments and directives will not need to borrow
money, and our verse about loans is not relevant to him. Consequently, the verse is
only relevant to a recipient whose behavior does not accord with the Torah’s
commandments. This leads to the following conclusions:
● It is unusual for a Jewish person to live a life that runs contrary to the dictates of the
Torah. It is highly unusual for the Torah to enact an obligation that only applies in
exceptional or uncommon circumstances.
● Since a person needs a loan precisely because he sinned and caused a blemish,53 it
would stand to reason that extending a loan to him should not be an obligation; it should
be optional.
Why, then, does Rashi say that the verse. “If you lend money…” implies an obligation,
while in all other instances in the Torah (except for two) where the word “if” appears, the
word implies optionality?
To dispel this flawed line of thinking, Rashi cites Rabbi Yishmael by name. A sharp
student might recall the following dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Shimon
bar Yochai, in tractate Berachos: “‘You shall gather your grain.’54 Why did the Torah
have to say this? For since it is stated: ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from
your mouth,’55 it would be possible to think that the words of the Torah here are meant
literally as they are written (i.e. one must study Torah day and night and thereby be
precluded from earning a living). The Torah therefore states: ‘You shall gather your
grain,’ to teach us that we must conduct our lives in the way of the world (i.e. Torah
study should be combined with earning a living), these are the words of Rabbi
Yishmael. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says, Can it be as you say? If a man ploughs at the
time of ploughing, and sows at the time of sowing, and harvests at the time of
harvesting, and threshes at the time of threshing, and winnows when it is windy, what
will become of the study of Torah? Rather, when the Jewish people fulfill Hashem’s will,
their work will be done for them by others, … but when the Jewish people do not fulfill
Hashem’s will, they must do their work themselves, as the verse says, ‘You shall gather
your grain.’”
Based on this Talmudic passage, Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion is that a person must be
involved in worldly matters in order to make a living. In his own words, “We must
conduct our lives in the way of the world.” Rabbi Yishmael assures us that if he
conducts his business affairs properly, taking care not to violate any Torah prohibitions,
and setting aside time for Torah study, then Hashem will provide a person’s necessities
without him having to take loans. Still, since a person must expend effort in earning a
living through natural means, he could easily fail to properly evaluate how much effort to
expend (either qualitatively or quantitatively). As a result of this failure, he may find
himself in need of a loan. It is obvious that under these circumstances, in which it is
difficult to properly evaluate how much effort to expend earning a livelihood, there is an
obligation to lend.
9. One may venture to say that Rabbi Yishmael’s explanation (that “if” may imply an
obligation) only applies in instances when the word “if” is used alone, without being
preceded by the conjunction “and.” But when the word “and-if”56 appears in the Torah, it
would seem to indicate doing something differently than the way it was done earlier
(such as, “ and-if you do it differently, the law is…”). This word appears to indicate an
optional change in a person’s actions. Therefore, it would seem impossible to interpret
the word and-if as implying an obligation.
Yet the fact that the majority (two-thirds) of the exceptions to Rabbi Yishmael’s rule
contain the word and-if -- “And if you make for me an altar of stones”;57 “And if you bring
a meal offering of the first grains…”58 -- indicates that the word “and-if” could imply an
obligation. (However, Rabbi Yishmael’s “rule” applies a novel interpretation, which
precludes all three cases from being obligatory).59 In order to indicate that “and-if” is
included in Rabbi Yishmael’s rule, Rashi is very precise in his choice of words. Rashi
writes, “Every if and-if…”60 (which doesn’t mean simply “every single case of if,” but
rather, “every case of ‘if” and “and-if”).61 Rashi’s intention in his precise choice of words
is to stress that Rabbi Yishmael’s rule applies whether the Torah uses the word “if,” or
the word “an-if,” (and secondarily to teach us that both “if” and “and-if” imply something
optional, with three exceptions).62
Following his methodology, Rashi is forced to say as follows, in analyzing the verses
concerning the construction of the altar:
The verse, “ An altar of earth you shall make for Me,”63 (which precedes the verse “ And if
you make for me an altar of stones...”),64 refers to the altar that the Jewish people
constructed in the desert. Rashi brings two interpretations on this verse: “Attached to
the ground, meaning that the altar should not be built on pillars. Alternatively, ‘an altar of
earth’ means that the hollow of the altar would be filled with earth when they camped.”
According to the second interpretation, one could ostensibly interpret the verse, “And if
you make for me an altar of stones” as an extension of the previous verse, and implying
something optional. The verse would then intend to teach that if a person filled the
desert altar with stones (and not earth), “he should not build them of hewn stones….”65
But according to the first interpretation, the second verse could not be interpreted as an
extension of the first verse, because they are describing two unrelated issues: “If you
make for me an altar of stones…” relates to the materials from which the altar itself is to
be constructed, and “an altar of earth” relates to the method of construction of the
altar. Since this is the first (and therefore, main) explanation, Rashi must66 interpret the
words, “If you make for me an altar of stones…” as an obligation, and as a second,
distinct commandment to build an altar after crossing the Jordan River. This verse does
not refer to the altar built in the desert.
This serves as an additional reason for Rashi to cite Rabbi Yishmael by name in his
commentary on Parshas Yisro . Rabbi Yishmael interprets the verse, “ An altar of earth
you shall make for Me” to mean that it should not be built on pillars.67 As explained
above, according to this interpretation, the second verse does not extend the first, as
they are describing two unrelated issues, and the word “if” in the second verse, “ And if
you make for me an altar of stones...” implies an obligation. That second verse presents
a second, distinct commandment to build an altar after crossing the Jordan River. This
verse does not refer to the altar built in the desert. By quoting Rabbi Yishmael by name,
Rashi clearly indicates that the word “if” in the second verse does not imply option; it
implies an obligation.
10. A weak argument could still be made that in spite of the obligation to build a stone
altar, the verse , “ And if you make for me an altar of stones...” implies something
optional . If the definition of “stone” can (in some instances)68 include brick, then the
verse requiring the altar to be built of stone (elsewhere in the Torah)69 that obligates the
Jewish people to build an altar of stone does not preclude them building a brick altar.
That is, they have the option to build a stone altar, or a brick altar. The word “if” in the
above verse could then be interpreted according to its plain meaning, implying
something optional: “And if you make an altar of stones (and not of bricks), you may
make it that way, but don’t make it of hewn stones.” (For the term “hewn” only applies to
an altar made of actual stones, and not bricks.)70
That is why Rashi71 proves that it is obligatory to build an altar of stones from the verse,
‘You shall build of whole stones,’72 (and not from the previous verse, “And there you
shall build… an altar of stones.”) The simple understanding of the term “whole stones” is
an actual stone that is not man-made. It is naturally whole, and was in the same form
from the time of its creation. This indicates that according to the plain meaning of the
Torah’s text, there is an obligation to make an altar from actual stones. Therefore, the
verse, “And if you make for me an altar of stones...” must imply an obligation , and not
something optional.
11.There is an additional reason why Rashi cites Rabbi Yishmael by name. We find a
dispute between Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva in the Talmud,73 where they discuss
whether certain ambiguous passages in the Torah imply an obligation or a choice.
Rabbi Yishmael is of the opinion that each of these passages implies a choice, and
Rabbi Akiva is of the opinion that each of these passages implies an obligation.
Rabbi Yishamel’s position in the Talmud is in line with his position as quoted in Rashi,
“Rabbi Yishmael says: ‘Every single “if” in the Torah74 implies something optional….”
Rabbi Yismael stresses that every instance of the word “if” implies an option (even if
there is room to interpret them as implying an obligation).75 On the other hand, there are
clear proofs for each of the three exceptions cited by Rabbi Yishmael that force him to
explain that they imply obligations.
This serves as an additional reason for Rashi citing Rabbi Yishmael by name. Rashi
alludes to us that interpreting these three exceptions as an obligation is an absolute
necessity, for even Rabbi Yishmael who always interprets ambiguous verses to imply
something optional, is of the opinion that these three imply an obligation.
12.From the “wine of Torah”76 in Rashi’s commentary: The dispute between Rabbi
Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva whether certain ambiguous passages in the Torah imply an
obligation or a choice is consistent with the distinct mode of each sage, in serving
Hashem.
Rabbi Yishmael was the High Priest.77 The legacy bequeathed to the High Priest from
birth, (in his very nature),78 is to be “holy to his G-d.”79 His mode of service is that of the
tzaddikim .80 Rabbi Akiva was a descendant of converts, and only started to study Torah
at the age of forty. He served Hashem via the pathway of teshuva .81
These two modes of divine service can be seen in the analysis by the Maggid of
Mezritch of a midrashic teaching. The Sifra teaches: “A person should not say, ‘It is
impossible for me to eat pork…’ (because it disgusts him) … rather, a person should
say, ‘I really could eat it, but what can I do? My Father in heaven decreed that it is
forbidden.’”82 The Maggid of Mezritch explains that this teaching of the Sifra applies to
someone who has never sinned before. However a ba’al teshuva ,83 who is prone to
return to his previous way of living,84 must say, “it is impossible …”
The same applies regarding the optional and the obligatory. The tzaddik , who by nature
is repulsed by anything antithetical to holiness, is able to serve Hashem in the realm of
holiness, and he had no obligation to involve himself in mundane, earthy matters. Yet
he does have the option to work with those ambiguous areas, areas where he as a
tzaddik has no obligation, in order to refine them. (Being a tzaddik though, he will likely
involve himself in areas that for him are only optional.)85 In contradistinction, the ba’al
teshuva , who must be extremely alert and cautious not to fall back into old habits, must
treat areas of ambiguity as obligations . If his habit was to study one page, he is now
obligated to study two pages.86
Therefore, when the status of a directive in Torah is ambiguous, Rabbi Yishmael
instructs us to treat it as optional, as his method of divine service is that of the
tzaddikim . In contrast, Rabbi Akiva instructs us to treat it as obligatory, as his method of
divine service follows the approach of the ba’al teshuva .
13.This provides a clear response to those who question the revelation of the teachings of
chassidus in our generation. They ask, “Is this generation worthy?” The response is that
generation is most worthy! Specifically in our era, as a result of the redoubled darkness
in our times, greater strength and fortitude is needed to stand up against any obstacle.
Through our efforts to spread the wellsprings of the teachings of chassidus outwards,
the master, king Moshiach will arrive soon indeed!
-Vol. XI Pg. 99 From sichos delivered Shabbos Parshas Mishpatim 5767 & 5769 (1967 & 1969) -
Footnotes:
1 The Hebrew word used for “if” in this verse is “ im .” Although “if” is the conventional translation of this word, Rashi indicates that in this verse, it is to be understood as an obligation to extend loans -- “ when you lend money,” rather than “ if you lend money.”
2 Shemos 22:24
3 In the original, kol im ve’im , which is literally translated, “every if and if.” This will be analyzed in section 9.
4 Gemilus chassadim in the original.
5 Shemos 22:24
6 Vayikra 2:14
7 Bereishis 4:7
8 Shemos 19:5
9 Vayikra 26:3
10 Parentheses in the original.
11 Shemos 21:30
12 Asher in the original. See the Rebbe’s note 12 in the original, which clarifies that asher is synonymous with ka’asher , “when.” This verse is to be understood to mean, “ When an atonement fine is levied upon him… he shall pay.”
13 Vayikra 2:14
14 Bamidbar 36:4
15 Dibbur hamaschil. Rashi begins each of his comments by quoting one or more words of the verse, known as the dibbur hamaschil . His usual methodology is only to quote words that pose a difficulty, or otherwise relate to his explanation of the verse.
16 Shemos 20:22
17 In footnote 14 in the original, the Rebbe comments that Rashi gives a longer explanation of this teaching in his commentary on parshas Yisro as it is the first time Rashi quotes his teaching. In our parsha , Rabbi Yishmael’s teaching is quoted more briefly, as Rashi relies on his readers remembering his earlier comments.
18 Devarim 27:6
19 Vayikra 2:14
20 Rashi on Shemos 20:22
21 Devarim 27:6
22 Devarim 27:5
23 Bereishit 39:6
24 Shemos 19:13
25 Rashi assumes the student reading his commentary is familiar with all earlier parts of the Torah. ( The Principles
of Rashi , Kehot Publication Society 1991 (Hebrew), 3:7 p. 82)
26 Bereishis 4:7
27 Shemos 19:5
28 Vayikra 26:3
29 Shemos 19:5
30 Vayikra 26:4
31 Shemos 22:24
32 In other words, it doesn’t make sense for the prohibition of interest to be conditional upon lending, when we
don’t know if lending is obligatory or not.
33 Shemos 20:22
34 Vayikra 2:14
35 In section 4.
36 Parentheses in the original.
37 = acts of kindness.
38 Bereishis 18:19
39 Bereishis 28:18; The “monument” here is understood to be an altar.
40 In section 3.
41 Bamidbar 36:4
42 The arrival of the Jubilee year does not involve human action; extending a loan, building an altar and offering
the omer sacrifice do involve human action.
43 Similar to “when you lend money”; “when you make an altar”; and “when you offer the omer .”
44 Parentheses in the original.
45 Vayikra 2:14
46 Bamidbar 36:4
47 Shemos 21:30
48 Rashi on Shemos 21:30
49 In footnote 28 in the original, the Rebbe notes that earlier in his commentary, Rashi teaches that precedence is
given to a Jew, seemingly indicating that loans are to be extended to gentiles. See the footnote for a detailed
analysis.
50 In the next section. Parentheses in the original
51 Shemos 16:32
52 Rashi on Shemos 16:32
53 A person’s sin in this world can even cause a blemish in the supernal worlds. See Tanya ch. 29.
54 Devarim 11:14
55 Yehoshua 1:8
56 In Hebrew “and-if” is written as a single word, ve’im .
57 Shemos 22:24
58 Vayikra 2:14
59 Parentheses in the original.
60 In our translation at the beginning of section 1, we translated “Every single if,” for ease of comprehension, however, in the original idiomatic Hebrew, it appears as “ kol im ve’im, ” which is literally translated “every if and-if.”
61 Parentheses in the original. The Rebbe illustrates this further in these parentheses, see the original Hebrew.
62 Parentheses in the original.
63 Shemos 20:21
64 The verse continues, “you shall not build them of hewn stones…”
65 Shemos 20:22
66 According to Rashi’s methodology, the first explanation he brings is primary, and he must interpret the verse on the basis of that explanation.
67 Rabbi Yismael is the author of this teaching, found in the Mechilsa on this verse.
68 Parentheses in the original.
69 Parentheses in the original.
70 Parentheses in the original.
71 Rashi on Shemos 20:22
72 Devarim 27:6
73 Sota 3a
74 In the original, kol im ve’im , which is literally translated, “every if and if.” This will be analyzed in section 9.
75 Parentheses in the original.
76 i.e the teachings of Chassidus .
77 Kohen (Gadol) in the original. See footnote 45 in the original for sources regarding Rabbi Yishmael’s position.
78 Parentheses in the original.
79 Vayikra 21:7
80 = The righteous.
81 = Repentance.
82 Sifra, end of Parshas Kedoshim
83 = A penitent, a person who has returned to Jewish observance, or is in the process of increasing his level of observance. Literally, a “master of return,” in that he is returning, or trying to get closer, to Hashem.
84 Suro ra in the original. He has developed bad habits before he became a ba’al teshuva , and is more easily tempted to sin.
85 Parentheses in the original. In the original, the Rebbe adds that there is a logic to an argument that the tzaddik should be obligated to be involved with the mundane, and directs us in footnote 52 to the Talmud’s discussion of the optional war, Sotah 42b.
86 4th section of Tanya, Iggeres haTeshuva, end of ch. 9.