Vol 33.16 - Korach 2                           Spanish French Audio  Video

Hebrew Text:

Page113   Page114   Page115   Page116   Page117   Page118   Page119  

Talmud - Bava Metziah
Talmud - Kiddushin
Talmud - Gittin

Translation:

Note: We have retained the Hebrew words in the translation for the following words:

• Meshaleiach: The sender or principal who dispatches his agent (Shliach) to perform a responsibility or task.
• Shliach:  An agent or emissary for a person who is empowered by the principal to act in his stead.
• Shlichut: The agency, mission or responsibility itself.

1. With regard to the obligation of giving Terumah (the tithe that the Levite gives to the Kohen), as the verse (Num. 18:28) states:

"So shall you too set aside a gift for the L-rd from all the tithes you take from the children of Israel” (כֵּן תָּרִימוּ גַם אַתֶּם תְּרוּמַת יְהֹוָה מִכֹּל מַעְשְׂרֹתֵיכֶם אֲשֶׁר תִּקְחוּ מֵאֵת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל),

the Sages learn from the words: “So shall you too“ that:

“Just as you, (namely) those who appoint agents, are members of the Covenant ( i.e., Jews), so too, your agents must be members of the covenant”.

(Meaning that the words: “you too” (אתם גם) come to include the agent, that he must be a Jew, for there is no agency for a gentile (אין שליחות לנכר). (Note: thus one cannot appoint a non-Jew as an emissary to separate Terumah even if appointed as an agent by a Jew).

We find in the Talmud a debate in the scope of this law:

“Rav Ashi said: When we say (that the Halacha is) that there is no agency for a gentile, this matter applies (to the laws of) Terumah, but concerning the rest of the Halachot of the Torah, there is agency for a gentile”.

And the Talmud concludes:

“This (distinction) of R. Ashi is to be rejected (ברותא). For why is Terumah different, that they cannot be agents for us? Because it is written: ‘you too ', (which teaches that) just as 'you' are members of the Covenant, so must your agents be members of the Covenant. But with regard to agency throughout the Torah, (namely his agent is like himself. Rashi) does not the same (exegesis) apply? For we derive it from Terumah (in tractate Kiddushin. Rashi).

Plainly this means that the reason of R’ Ashi that the law of “there is no agency for a gentile” (אין שליחות לנכר) just applies to Terumah and not to the entire Torah, is because he holds that we do not learn the concept of agency in the entire Torah from Terumah.

However, seemingly it is difficult to say that the debate here is whether we learn that (the law of) agency in the entire Torah (is derived) from (the law of) Terumah. Moreover, it is probable to say that the difference between R’ Ashi and the conclusion of the Talmud is in the logic (סברא).

R’ Ashi holds that this law of: “just as you are members of the Covenant etc.“ is a Gezeirat HaKatuv (גזירת הכתוב - a biblical decree). For according logic we should say that even a gentile should be able to be an agency for a Yid. Therefore we only have his innovation and we therefore say so just regarding Terumah and not for the entire Torah.

However, according to the conclusion of the Talmud, this is according to logic, namely the a Shliach must be similar to the Meshaleiach himself as it states: “just as you . . so must your agents etc.“ in other words when it says regarding Terumah "you too”, it is just a revelation of the fact, that the scope of the agency obligates that the Shliach must be similar to the Meshaleiach – therefore there is no agency for a gentile (even) in the entire Torah.

2. It appears that they argue in the essential scope of agency. This can be understood by prefacing the well-known differentiation (חקירה) regarding Shlichut that "one's emissary (Shliach) is similar to the person (who dispatched him, the Meshaleiach) (שלוחו של אדם כמותו)."

This can be understood in a variety of ways:

1. That one's Shliach is actually akin (ממש ״כמותו״) to the Meshaleiach himself with regard to the one who does the deed. This means that the body of the Shliach is like the body of the Meshaleiach (Thus, as a matter of course, the actions of the Shliach are considered as the actions of the Meshaleiach). (Note: the agent is considered as if he was an extension of the principal, a "long hand," as it were. Every dimension of the agent's being is associated with the principal).

2. The Shliach is “similar” (כמותו) to the Meshaleiach (only) with regard to the power (כח) of the deed of the Shliach of the deed. Thus the deeds of the Shliach are considered to be the deeds of the Meshaleiach. (Note: Although the agent is considered an independent entity, since he is acting under the agency of the principal, the deed is considered as if performed by the principal).

3. The Shliach is considered “similar” (כמותו) to the Meshaleiach only with regard to the results (לתוצאות) of the actions. In other words this means (that he is similar to him only) with regard to the object that the deed is performed. Therefore even the deeds of the Shliach are not the deeds of the Meshaleiach, except with regard to the deed of the Shliach in the actual object. For then is (effects the same effect) as if the Meshaleiach performs it. (Note: the consequences of the deed - both positive and negative - are borne by the principal.)

According to this one could say that R’ Ashi’s view is like the third aforementioned method - that even the act of the Shlichut is not related to the Meshaleiach, but rather to the Shliach. And since the Shliach does not stand in the stead of the Meshaleiach (and his deed is not even considered the deed of the Meshaleiach) therefore if he is just a person that has a relation to this deed, he can be a Shliach of one who requests him and connects him with this deed. This is similar to one who connects one to a rope and does not oppose this.

Therefore, he holds that in the entire Torah “there is agency for a gentile”. For is the Shlichut is in such a manner that even a gentile is related to its deed, he is able to be a Shliach for a Jew.

However, the conclusion of the Talmud is that “This (distinction) of R. Ashi is to be rejected (ברותא) “. For this opinion is unfounded, and it must be that the Shliach is similar to the Meshaleiach “just as you . . so must your agents etc.“). In other words, even if one were to say that the aspect of Shlichut is like the third aforementioned manner, namely that the deed is the act of the Shliach, nevertheless, the aspect of Shlichut, is not possible except with one who is similar to the Meshaleiach. And this is according to all the methods that explain the concept of Shlichut.

The rationale of the aspect is:

In Shlichut there are two aspects:

1. The fulfillment of the actual Shlichut.
2. The conferring (חלות) of the name Shliach.

All the three aforementioned methods in the scope of Shlichut are just related to the actual fulfillment of the Shlichut:

When we judge how the deeds of this person (the Shliach) helps another person (the Meshaleiach) – then it is possible to say a reason for this according to the three methods, namely:

• Whether it is because Torah innovated in the concept of Shlichut that the deed of the Shliach helps like the deed of the Meshaleiach,
• or whether it is because of the reason that his deed is considered like the deed of the Meshaleiach,
• or more than that, that the body of the Shliach is considered like the body of the Meshaleiach, and therefore his deed is like the deed of the Meshaleiach.

However, before this there must be the conferring of the Shlichut on the Shliach. In other words the appointing that effects the name Shliach, on the person. And in order to confer the name Shliach, there must be a connection between the Shliach and the Meshaleiach. For it is impossible to be the agent of the Meshaleiach (in whatever manner) without him being “similar” (כמותו) to the Meshaleiach“. For “the Shliach needs to have some relation in some form” to the Meshaleiach.

Therefore there is no agency for a gentile in the entire Torah, for he is not able to be “similar to the Meshaleiach“ (the Yisroel).

3. According to the aforementioned explanation in the words of R’ Ashi, one can also explain another statement of R’ Ashi in the matter of Shlichut, that we also find is unfounded in Halacha - in the law of a Shliach appointing a Shliach, that there may be many agents (“even one hundred”).

For R’ Ashi holds that “If the first (Shliach) dies, they are all nullified. Mar bar R’ Ashi said: This statement of my father dates from his youth (in his youth my father said this statement that one must correct). If the husband dies, is there any substance left in them? From whom do they all derive their status? From the power of the husband. As long as the husband is alive, they are all agents; if the husband dies they all cease to be agents”.

The Acharonim write that the dispute between R’ Ashi and Mar bar R’ Ashi (if they derive their status from the first Shliach or from the power of the husband) is that Mar bar R’ Ashi holds that a Shliach is like the Meshaleiach himself or at least that his deed is related to the Meshaleiach. Therefore we find that the first Shliach (and like him all the agents that succeed him) derive their status from the power of the husband who is the Meshaleiach, for he is standing in his place. Whereas R’ Ashi holds that the Shliach is not like the Meshaleiach himself. And even his deed is not related to the Meshaleiach, but it just helps on behalf of the Meshaleiach. If so the second Shliach is not made a Shliach from the power of the Meshaleiach but rather from the power of the first Shliach.

However, one must examine this:

For from the words of Mar bar R’ Ashi: “This statement of my father dates from his youth“, it is understood that the opinion of R’ Ashi is unfounded in Halacha (and also it is ruled as Halacha like Mar bar R’ Ashi). The Acharonim cite many proofs (also) like this side regarding Shlichut that the deed is only considered that of the deed of the Shliach.

Therefore it appears that even here the view of R’ Ashi is not just from the reason that the deed of the Shliach is not considered like the deed of the Meshaleiach (and it is just that his deed helps on behalf of the Meshaleiach) but rather because he holds more than this, namely that since the entire aspect of Shlichut is just in relation to the result of the deed in the object (as aforementioned), there does not need to be any relation between the Shliach and the Meshaleiach.

In other words:

After the Meshaleiach appoints him a Shliach, then the Shliach does not come from the power of the Meshaleiach, but rather the “power” (״כח״) of the Shlichut is within him. Therefore it is if he is the principal/master (הבעלים) on this thing. And from this reason, he holds that “If the first (Shliach) dies, they are all nullified“. For the Shlichut does not come from the power of the Meshaleiach but rather from the power of the first Shliach.

And this is why Mar bar R’ Ashi says that this concept that is entirely unfounded – namely what his father said in his youth - for “From whom do they all derive their status? From the power of the husband“. In other words, the scope of Shlichut is that which “it comes from the power“ of the Meshaleiach (for the essential description of the word Shliach means that he is the power of the Meshaleiach) as it states “the Shliach of a person is like himself” (שלוחו של אדם כמותו). Therefore it is impossible to convey the aspect of Shlichut to someone (the first Shliach etc.), without him coming and deriving from husband – the Meshaleiach. And even if one were to say that the deed of the Shlichut (and even the act of the appointment of Shlichut) is considered as if he made him as a Shliach (like the aforementioned third manner) – nevertheless he is not the master at all on the aspect of “they all derive . . (just) from the power of the husband“, as discussed previously at length.

4. According to the aforementioned, it is fitting that the learning to exclude gentiles from the law of Shlichut – “just as you are members of the Covenant etc. “ is said regarding Terumah and not regarding divorce and so forth (for the law of Shlichut is stated even in them).

There is a critical difference between the aspect of the Shlichut, for separating Terumah, and Shlichut with other aspects – divorce etc.:

In separating Terumah, the main point is the result (הנפעל), namely that the Terumah is separated from the produce. Therefore it makes sense that the aspect of the Shlichut in Terumah does not need to be in the manner that (it is considered as if) the Meshaleiach (the owner of the produce) performs the deed of the separating, but rather that since he is the owner of the produce, therefore the separating has to be with his knowledge – even though it is the deed of the Shliach.

Whereas regarding divorce, it is simple that the one divorcing must specifically be the husband. For divorce is (not just the act of writing and giving the divorce paper (the Get), but rather mainly) that the husband divorces his wife. And it is understood that Shlichut in giving a Get means that through the making of the Shliach it is considered that the husband divorces the wife.

According to this, if the Torah would have written the law of “just as you are members of the Covenant etc.“ regarding divorce, and so forth, there would have been a supposition to say that it is just in things that require the deed of the principals (הבעלים) . Therefore the Shliach needs to be similar to the Meshaleiach (the principals) for then he is fitting to stand in the place of the principals.

Therefore this law is specifically stated by Terumah, to teach us that the entire aspect of Shlichut (in whatever form) – even in Terumah, where we judge only on the deed and effect that helps for the Yisroel – it is not conceivable (יתכן לא) that the name Shliach should be in conferred, if the Shliach is not similar to the Meshaleiach (“just as you are . . so too your agents“). For the main aspect of Shlichut is that the Shliach is “like the Meshaleiach”.

5. And one can bring a proof for this aspect from the words of the Alter Rebbe. For regarding the aspect of Shlichut he writes:

“One's Shliach is similar to himself” (שלוחו של אדם כמותו). Therefore there is no agency for a deaf-mute, a mentally defective person, or a minor for they are not similar to the Meshaleiach”.

Seemingly one must examine this. For it is explained in the Talmud that the reason that they are not able to be agents is because “they are not cognizant” (לאו בני דיעה נינהו).

And even though one could say that this is the explanation of the Talmud, namely that since they are not cognizant, therefore they are not “like the Meshaleiach” – nevertheless it requires explanation as to what the necessity is for this explanation?

However, according to the aforementioned, one could say:

There is a well-known axiom that a “minor does not have intent but he has deed” (קטן אין לו כוונה אבל יש לו מעשה). According to this, if one were to say that the aspect of Shlichut is not that the Shliach stands in place of the Meshaleiach, but rather just that his deed helps on behalf of the Meshaleiach, therefore, if so, in matters that do not require intent, but just deed alone, there is no reason, seemingly, that a minor could not have the law of an agent?

And this is why the Alter Rebbe precisely states that the reason that a deaf mute, a mentally defective person, and a minor are not able to be agents is because they are not “like the Meshaleiach”. Therefore they are excluded (מופקעים) in essence from the scope of Shlichut. In other words, even though with regard to the deed of the Shlichut, there is room to say that they are in the realm of Shlichut, for their deed helps on behalf of the Meshaleiach, nevertheless, they do not have the law of agency. For it is impossible to confer on them the name Shliach, since they are not “like the Meshaleiach”.

6. The law of Shlichut, plainly, between a person and his fellow, is taken and derived from the aspect of Shlichut between man and G-d, between Yidden to their Father in Heaven:

Each person of Bnei Yisroel is a Shliach of G-d. The messenger of –Supernal – man is like Him, in order to complete the intent of Creation through the Avodah in fulfilling Torah and Mitzvot.

And since there are three manners in the law of Shlichut, as aforementioned, so too is it in Avodat HaAdam, namely that there are three levels in the manner of devotion and bitul of the Shliach (the person) to the Meshaleiach (G-d).

• There is a level in Avodat HaShem, where the person that serves –feels himself as an independent being in all his deeds. However he forces himself to fulfill G-d’s will. Through his deed, he fulfills his Shlichut of G-d.

• Then there is the person who effects within himself am inner bitul, so much so that his deeds are related to the Meshaleiach. In other words, his deeds and aspects (with regard to Shlichut) are devoted and dedicated to G-d. So much so that these actions are not entities unto themselves, and they are entirely of the power of the Meshaleiach.
• An even loftier level is that of one who is entirely nullified before G-d, so much so that his very being (and as a result all his actions) are only the entity of the Meshaleiach.

However, all these levels are only related to the fulfillment of the Shlichut. However, the reason that each and every Jew has the ability to perform this Shlichut (in any of form) is because the title "Shliach” is conferred on him. And the conferring of this name can only be on Bnei Yisroel (and not on the nations of the world, to distinguish). For only on the Jewish people can it be said that they are “actually similar to the Meshaleiach”. This is because the souls of Yisroel are "His nation are a portion of Him", an "utter part of G-d above". Therefore only they possess the relation of “some sort of similarity” to G-d, the Meshaleiach and so much so that "they are actually similar to the Meshaleiach."

(This is also alluded to in the saying of our Sages, "Just as you are Children of the Covenant, so too etc." For every Jew is a "member of the Covenant" with G-d. This is the very essence of a Jewish person (found equally within each and every Jew) namely that he is included in the “members of the Covenant “. In other words the connection and bond between Yisroel and their Father in Heaven).

From all this, we can learn an actual lesson in Avodat HaShem:

Even one who’s Avodah is still in a very low level, namely that he is an independent entity and just one whose actions are on behalf of G-d. Nevertheless, since his essential being is one of "actually similar to the Meshaleiach", he is able -- and therefore required -- to inject, even in this Avodah, vitality from the essence of his soul.

7. Even though the words of R’ Ashi

(That there is agency for a gentile and as explained previously the reason of the matter, namely that he holds that a Shliach does not have to be “similar to the Meshaleiach“)

are rejected in Halacha so much so that we say he “is in error” – nevertheless, since his words were recorded in the Torah of truth (אמת), one must say that there is something in them.

And one could say the explanation of this is – in Avodat HaAdam:

In Avodat HaAdam to his Master, there is a virtue when the Shliach is independent (separate from the Meshaleiach). For then, his Avodah visibly possesses the virtue of “his own kav/measure”. And as the Sages state, that according to man’s nature of his creation: “A person would rather have a kav/measure of his own (grain) than nine kavim/measures of his fellow's“ (אדם רוצה בקב שלו מתשעה קבין של חברו.).

We actually see this, for when one’s feeling, with regard to a certain thing, is because it is related to him – this evokes within him a much greater effort, and consequently a much greater pleasure etc.

The same is in spiritual Avodah. For when his Avodah is in a manner that he does not feel his being and only considers the Meshaleiach (or even in the low level of Shlichut, that he considers his deeds as the deeds of the Shliach and it is just for the sake of the Meshaleiach), this can cause a weakness in the aspect of the effort.

For example:

When one exerts himself with all of his strength, and nevertheless, the matter is still not complete, he can think that since he did all that he could, but the matter is the Meshaleiach’s (G-d) - therefore, he did what he could, and the rest is up to the Meshaleiach to complete it.

Therefore, there is a virtue in feeling that there is the being of the Shliach and that the matter of the Shlichut was entrusted to him and that it is his matter. Therefore the matter is especially related to him.

(And as is known the parable in this. For the difference between the devotion of an overseer (פקיד) or hired laborer who faithfully does a task versus the devotion of the owner, in a matter is:

• When the trusted employee performs his work with all of his ability of his visible strengths, he then goes about his own affairs, in peace. For truthfully, he did all that was required of him.
• Whereas the owner – cannot sleep peacefully, even if he did all that is in his power and therefore hidden abilities are revealed within him etc.)

8. However, the conclusion of the Talmud is “This distinction of R. Ashi is to be rejected (ברותא)“. For even though there is a virtue in the Shliach feeling his being, nevertheless this does not contradict, G-d forbid, the axiom that “the Shliach of a person is like himself” (שלוחו של אדם כמותו)“, namely that the Shliach must be bitul to the Meshaleiach.

The reason of the matter is:

The reason that there must be the entity of the Shliach (separate from the Meshaleiach), is, in itself, just because this is the will and pleasure of the Meshaleiach. For specifically through this is there pleasure to G-d that I spoke and they performed My Will/nachat ruach le'fanai, she'amarti v’naaseh retzoni”).

And from this it is understood that, on a deeper level, the being of the Shliach (is not an independent entity, but rather is) united with the being of the Meshaleiach to become one entity.

(And on the contrary. This itself is the innovation in the concept of Shlichut, namely that the Shliach must be a person who possesses independent intellect (and not a minor) who is entrusted with the power and strength of the Meshaleiach. Yet nevertheless, all his power (in the matter of the Shlichut) comes from the power of the Meshaleiach).

Therefore we find that there is no level and manner in Shlichut that allows the Shliach to remain a (truly) independent entity. But rather this matter (that the Shliach must be an independent being) is an additional part in the aspect of Shlichut (that the “the Shliach of a person is like himself“). For in order to properly complete the will of the Meshaleiach, it must be that the deed of the Shliach is performed through the entity of the Shliach (so much so that he feels himself as being the master of the matter).

And this is also the hint in the (aforementioned) statement of the Sages “A person would rather have a kav of his own than nine kavim of his fellow's“:

“A person” and “his fellow” refers to Yidden and G-d (“your neighbor . . is G-d”). For through both of them together there is ten kavim that depict completeness (for ten is a complete number).

And in order to attain this completeness, there must be the connection of “his kav” and the “nine kavim of his fellow”. In other words, on one hand there must be the person’s effort. For in this he feels that this is his own (“his kav”). Yet together with this he must recognize that all of his work (including that which there is “his kav”) is for the sake of “his fellow”. And through the combination of both of them together – there is all the ten kavim.

MSichas Chof Menachem Av 5745

21 Menachem Av 5744