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Vol 27.15 - Metzora 1 Spanish French Audio Video |
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Page 101 Page102 Page103 Page104 Page105 Page106
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| Summary:
(5746) Rambam's view in the law of when a rich man says: "I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted poor person", and conversely a poor person who says "I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted poor person" (end of Hilchot Mechussarey Kapparaht (5:11) and Hilchot Maaseh Hakorbanot (14:9) |
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Translation: 1. Rambam writes at the end of Hilchot Mechussarey Kapparah (5:11): “When a rich man says: ‘I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted person’, and the afflicted person was poor, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man, for the person who took the vow has the financial capacity. If a poor-person said: ‘I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted person’, and the afflicted person was wealthy, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man, for the person who took the vow obligated himself to bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man.” It is seemingly not understood:
The Talmud states: “And although he who vowed is rich? (But did not the Divine Law say) “And if he be poor”, and he (who vowed) is not poor?” The question however is: Since the person who took the vow is not obligated in the Korban of the Metzora at all (כלל וכלל). It is only that he took upon himself the obligation of this poor-person. Therefore, how does one know that, in such a case, an obligation should be placed upon him to bring the Korban of a wealthy-person? Who is speaking (מאן דכר) about a wealthy Metzora‘s instance?
“For the person who took the vow obligated himself to bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man” Rambam, seemingly, should have stated, “for this Metzora is obligated in the Korban of the wealthy-person” (In other words, since the Metzora is wealthy, therefore, the person who took the vow, who wants to absolve the other’s obligation, must bring the Korban of the wealthy-person). 2. Another puzzlement in the aspect is: This aforementioned law is cited by Rambam earlier in Hilchot Maaseh Hakorbanot (14:9): “When a person says: "I promise to bring the sacrifices of this person afflicted by Tzara’at" or "...this women who gave birth," if the afflicted person or the women are poor, the one who took the vow should bring the sacrifices of a poor-person. If they were wealthy, the person who took the vow must bring the sacrifice of a wealthy-person even though (the one who took the vow) is poor”. This is a contradiction from one Halacha to the other: How can Rambam rule in Hilchot Maaseh Hakorbanot, “The one who took the vow should bring the sacrifices of a poor-person”, plainly, without qualification? This is especially so when he expressly states, in Hilchot Mechussarey Kapparah, that if the person who took the vow is wealthy, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy-person? The Kesef Mishneh averts this question and states: “Rambam did not deem to explain it here because he is relying on what he states there”. This answer, however, only fits according to the view of the Kesef Mishneh, that Rambam in his sefer, relies on (on the reader to correlate) what he writes in one place, to another place, even when that place is further than the first place. However, according to those opinions, and this appears so, seemingly, that Rambam only relies only ”upon what he has already written in the previous place. However to say that he relies here, on what will come before us (later), is a reliance that has no standing”. 3. One could answer, that in this law, there are two boundaries:
(And if the Metzora is wealthy – he must bring, on his behalf, as he vowed, the sacrifices of a wealthy-person).
The explanation of this is: The law is that: “A sin-offering and a guilt-offering . .may not be brought because of a pledge or a vow. (Hence) if one says: "I promise to bring a sin-offering" or "...a guilt-offering," his statements are of no consequence” (לא אמר כלום). However, if one says: “’I promise to bring the (offering etc.) of so-and-so’ If that person agrees, he may allow him to bring those sacrifices for him and he receives atonement thereby (על ידו ומתכפר לו)”. One could say that in this law (that one can bring a sin-offering etc. for another, who is obligated in it), there are two innovations:
(There is no obligation upon him to fulfill the vow). However, when do we say this? When the sin-offering etc., does not contain any element of obligation (קיין צד חיוב) However, when the person who took the vow says, “’I promise to bring the (offering etc.) of so-and-so’” (One who is obligated in the matter), In that case, an obligation to bring the Korban, rests on the person who took the vow due to the law of a vow.
(or one who found himself in a situation, which requires an atonement – like in our case – a Metzora). Nevertheless, Torah innovates that due to the ‘Mutual Guaranteeing’ of Yidden (ערבות) (as it states, “all Yisroel are guarantors for one another”), a second Yid may bring the Korban “for him” (על ידו) and the second person’s Korban effects the atonement for the sinner (חוטא) (or for the one who is lacking atonement – the Metzora). 4. This is the gist of the difference between the two laws in Hilchot Maaseh Hakorbanot and in Hilchot Mechussarey Kapparah:
For the words of the vow (דיבור הנדר) are “I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted person”. He took upon himself the Korbanot of this Metzora. And since the Metzora is poor, from the perspective of the laws of vows, he is obligated to bring the sacrifices of a poor-person. (Similarly, it is with the converse – “If they were wealthy, the person who took the vow must bring the sacrifice of a wealthy-person even though the person who took the vow is poor.”)
(Not in order to fulfill his obligation (due to his vow), but) to effect the lack of atonement (חסרון הכפרה), for the Metzora. (This is the reason for the precise differences in wording of Rambam.
“The one who took the vow should bring the sacrifices of a poor-person”
“He must bring for him (על ידו), the sacrifices of a wealthy-person” This is because:
This is the reason why in Hilchot Mechussarey Kapparah, Rambam states, “he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy-man”. For the law from the perspective of “Mechussarey Kapparah” (lacking atonement) is that, due to the aspect of ‘Mutual Guaranteeing’ (ערבות), a second Yid may take upon himself the bringing of the Korban of the Metzora (as if the person who took the vow, would have been the Metzora himself) Since the person who took the vow is the one who brings and offers the Korban Metzora, therefore, it (in this detail) is measured according to the wherewithal (not of the Metzora, but rather) of the person who took the vow. Moreover, if “the person who took the vow has the financial capacity”, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy-person, for “The Torah says ‘And if he be poor’, and he (who vowed) is not poor”. 5. According to this, Rambam’s wording in the second case, “A poor-person who said . . and the afflicted person was wealthy, he must bring (the sacrifices of a) wealthy-man, for the person who took the vow obligated himself to bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man”, is also resolved: Even though from the perspective of “Hilchot Mechussarey Kapparah”, one indeed considers the wherewithal of the one (the person who took the vow) who brings the Korban, as aforementioned. Moreover, since the one who brings the Korban is in the situation of being a poor-person, he must bring a poor-person’s Korban. Nevertheless, he must, in this case, bring the sacrifices of a wealthy-person. For, “this one who took the vow is obligated to bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man”. Due to his vow, he obligated himself to bring “the sacrifices of this afflicted person” (who is a wealthy-person). He must, therefore, bring the sacrifices of a wealthy-person (as Rambam states in Hilchot Maaseh Hakorbanot, as aforementioned). This explanation, however, is not completely straightforward. For Rambam also states in the second case, “He must bring for him (על ידו), the sacrifices of a wealthy-person” From this emphasis, it implies, as aforementioned, that his obligation to bring “the sacrifices of a wealthy-person” is (not just due to his vow, but rather) also due to the atonement of the Metzora. (This is especially so, since there is a ramification according to Halacha: If the obligation to bring “the sacrifices of a wealthy-person” is just due to his fulfillment of the vow, and not because of the atonement of the Metzora, it must come out that, after the fact (בדיעבד), if the person who took the vow (the poor-person) brought the Korbanot of a poor-person, the Metzora is atoned for. However, the person who took the vow did not fulfill his vow. Which is not so when this is an obligation also due to the atonement of the Metzora, as is understood). One could say that the explanation of this is: Even though the person who took the vow himself is poor, and it should be measured according to his financial capacity – however, since, with his vow, he obligated himself (to bring) the sacrifices of a wealthy-person, it is as if the vow itself effected upon him, that he should have the boundary (גדר) of the financial capacity of a wealthy-person - This is also from the perspective of the atonement of the Metzora. Therefore, “He must bring for him (על ידו), the sacrifices of a wealthy-person” Similarly, “one may take an oath to fulfill a Mitzvah” since this will naturally and actually exhort himself (מזרז זיין) to exert himself to fulfill his vow – so much so that it will be “endeavor and you shall find” (יגעת ומצאת). 6. From this, one has a tremendous lesson in the great power of Ahavat Yisroel and Achdut Yisroel: At the very first, one sees, how one Yid can do so much for another Yid, that through his bringing a Korban, the second Yid is given atonement. This is not just in a case when the second Yid is a poor-person and does not have the ability to bring his own Korban. Rather it is even when the Metzora is wealthy - a second Yid (and even one who is poor!) may bring, for him, his Korban. This pertains, so much, that when the Korban is brought, the person, who took the vow, is considered as though he is the one who needs the atonement and we account for his (the person who took the vow) financial capacity. For this is the true aspect of Achdut Yisroel, that Yidden are like one body (as is explained in the Talmud Yerushalmi). Therefore, when there is a blemish and deficiency in one Yid, G-d forbid, (in one “limb” of this body), this is felt in all the “limbs” of the entire being (קומה כללית) (Klal Yisroel). For it is not just “the other’s” (יענעם׳ס) deficiency and blemish, but rather his own deficiency and blemish. (This is as is explained, the reason why even Tzaddikim say the text of the “Vidui” (confession) prayer, “we have trespassed etc.”, even though, sin is not applicable to them, and especially many of those detailed sins. For since “all Yisroel” are like “one body” and “this is the mutual guarantee that one guarantees for his fellow, if he sins”). 7. Another greater aspect is also emphasized here: When a Yid applies himself to effect the atonement for another Yid, in the time when he himself is poor and the second person is wealthy – the Torah places him in the category of a “wealthy-person” and he is obligated to bring, for the other person, the “sacrifices of a wealthy-person”. If he himself would have been, G-d forbid, a Metzora – he would not be obligated in the sacrifices of a wealthy-person. Yet when he takes upon himself to help another Yid – he is obligated in the sacrifices of a wealthy-person (as his “financial capacity”, as aforementioned)! One could say that the (inner) reason and explanation in this, is according to what has been told many times. Namely, that we saw with the Rebbe Rayatz, that when he dealt with printing here (in the United States), for the first time, the Responsa of the Tzemach Tzedek, that he advised a certain Yid to donate the cost of the printing of the books – even though according to that person’s standing and situation, it was completely beyond his ability. Yet this Yid accepted it upon himself, and the Rebbe blessed him etc. Afterword, this Yid became wealthy and was able to successfully carry out his pledge, in full. He gave the entire amount to publish the sefarim. The Rebbe said at that time, that when he requested the pledge from that Yid, this was indeed not within his ability (even not according to what was granted to him from Above). However, due to the good resolution itself (החלטה טובה), new “conduits” (צנורוח) of livelihood were opened from Above, to enable him to fulfill fill his pledge. Similarly, this explanation applies to our case: When G-d sees how a Yid goes out of his boundaries, and, not looking at his being a poor-person, exerts himself, more than his ability, for the atonement of his wealthy friend – G-d “opens” new “conduits” of Parnassah, to enable him to fulfill this good resolution – with wealth. MSichas, 26th Tishrei 5746
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